Kant's Thinker

This book examines the Critique of Pure Reason's account of the relation between cognition and self-consciousness. It shows how the theory that cognizers must understand their mental states as standing in relations of rational connection has implications for theories of the self-ascription of belief, consciousness and knowledge of other subjects.

Sommario

• 1. Overview


• 1. Introduction


• 2. Interpretive Framework


• 3. Preview


• 4. Current Work on Kant's 'I-Think'


• Part I: Background


• 2. Locke's Internal Sense and Kant's Changing Views


• 1. Locke's Influence


• 2. Locke's Complex Theory of Internal Sense


• 3. Kant's Varied Reactions


• 4. 'Inner Sense' in relation to Kantian 'Apperception'


• 5. Kant's Use of 'Inner Sense'


• 3. Personal Identity and Its Problems


• 1. Locke's Problem


• 2. Leibniz's Criticisms and Additions


• 3. Kant and Hume


• 4. Tetens (and Hume)


• 4. Rationalist Metaphysics of Mind


• 1. The Role of Rationalism


• 2. Leibniz's Elegant 'I-theory'


• 3. Faculties, Powers and Substances


• 4. Rational Psychology


• 5. Consciousness, Self-Consciousness and Cognition


• 1. Introduction


• 2. Locke's 'Reflection' and Leibniz's 'Apperception'


• 3. Self-consciousness and Object cognition


• 4. Self-Consciousness through Self-Feeling


• 5. Summary


• 6. Strands of Argument in the Duisburg Nachla?


• 1. Introduction


• 2. Kant's Objection to the Inaugural Dissertation


• 3. Principles of Appearance and Thought in the Duisburg NachlaB Notion of Apperception?


• 4. What is the Duisburg Nachla?'s Notion of 'Apperception?


• 5. From the Duisburg NachlaB to the Critique


• Part II: Theory


• 7. A Transcendental Deduction for A Priori Concepts


• 1. Kant's Goal


• 2. Clues to the Nature of the Argument


• 3. The First Premise of the Transcendental Deduction


• 4. Apriority and Activity


• 5. A 'Transcendental' Deduction


• 8. Synthesis: Why and How?


• 1. Problems to be Solved


• 2. Kant's Definition


• 3. Synthesis and Objective Reference


• 4. Five Syntheses and Their Relations


• 9. Arguing for Apperception


• 1. Introduction


• 2. 'I-Think' as the 'Cogito'; The One-step Deduction from Judgment


• 3. What Kind of Cognition Is at Issue in the Transcendental Deduction?


• 4. What is the Principle of Apperception?


• 5. The Apperceptive Synthesis of Recognition in a Concept


• 6.Combination and Self-Consciousness in the B Deduction


• 7. Arguing from the Unity of Apperception to the Necessary Applicability of Categories to Intuitions


• 8. Transcendental Apperception, Empirical Apperception and 'Mineness'


• 9. Summary


• 10. The Power of Apperception


• 1. Introduction


• 2. What is the Power/Faculty of Apperception?


• 3. Does the Faculty of Apperception Endure? Is it the 'Inner Principle' of a Substance?


• 4. Does the Power of Apperception Initiate Causal Chains or Provide Impressions of Necessary Connection?


• 5. 'Is it an Experience That I think?'


• 6. Root Powers, Scientific Ideals and the Ground of Appearances


• 11. 'I-Think' as the Destroyer of Rational Psychology


• 1. Understanding Kant's Criticisms


• 2. Kant's Earlier and Later Treatments of Rational Psychology


• 3. 'I-Think' as the Vehicle of the Categories


• 4. 'I-Think' as Analytically Contained in the Concept of Thought


• 5. Does the Analysis of Cognition Imply the Existence of a Thinker?


• 6. Why Can't Thinkers Know Themselves as Such?


• Part III: Evaluation


• 12. Is Kant's Theory Consistent?


• 1. The Old Objection


• 2. The Most Problematic Passage (A251-52)


• 3. The Confusion about the Causes of Sensations


• 4. A Second Look at the Most Problematic Passage


• 5. Criticizing Rationalist Confusions


• 6. What Kant's Epistemology and Metaphysics Imply


• 13. The Normativity Objection


• 1. Psychologism or Noumenalism?


• 2. Scrutinizing Sensations and Adding 'Transcendental Content'


• 3. Forming Concepts and Acquiring the I-Representation


• 4. Making A Priori Principles Explicit and Testing Instances


• 5. Normativity and the I-rule


• Appendix to Chapter 13: Longuenesse on Concept Formation


• 14. Is Kant's Thinker (as Such) a Free and Responsible Agent?


• 1. Introduction


• 2. Texts Linking Theoretical and Practical Reason


• 3. Autonomy and Accountability


• 4. Intellectual Accountability


• 15. Kant our Contemporary


• 1. Supporting and Showing Relevance


• 2. Transcendental Arguments


• 3. Must Rational Cognition involve Self-consciousness?


• 4. A Second Hard Problem of Consciousness?


• 5. Other 'I's

Info autore

Patricia Kitcher is Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University. She is the author of Kant's Transcendental Psychology.

Riassunto

This book examines the Critique of Pure Reason's account of the relation between cognition and self-consciousness. It shows how the theory that cognizers must understand their mental states as standing in relations of rational connection has implications for theories of the self-ascription of belief, consciousness and knowledge of other subjects.

Testo aggiuntivo

In Kant's Thinker's pages we find a coherent, plausible, interpretation of the issues surrounding Kant's theory of the cognitive subject: cognition, synthesis, apperception, object-consciousness, the failure of rational psychology, whether thinking is an experience, etc. A significant achievement and a lasting contribution to the field.

Dettagli sul prodotto

• Autori: Patricia Kitcher, Patricia (Professor of Philosophy Kitcher
• Editore: Oxford University Press
• Lingue: Inglese
• Formato: Tascabile
• Pubblicazione: 01.02.2014
• EAN: 9780199363728
• ISBN: 978-0-19-936372-8
• Pagine: 328
• Categorie: Saggistica > Filosofia, religione > Filosofia: dall'antichità ai giorni nostri; Scienze umane, arte, musica > Scienze linguistiche e letterarie > Linguistica generale e comparata