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Informationen zum Autor Stephen M. Engel is an Assistant Professor of Politics at Bates College in Lewiston, Maine. He holds a PhD in political science from Yale University as well as an MA in social thought from New York University and a BA in interdisciplinary social science from Wesleyan University. In 2007–08, he held a research fellowship at the American Bar Foundation where he conducted research on anti-Court activism in the United States. He is the author of The Unfinished Revolution: Social Movement Theory and the Gay and Lesbian Movement (Cambridge University Press, 2001). He has also published in Studies in American Political Development and Law and Social Inquiry. Klappentext Engel examines changing politicians' perceptions of the threat posed by opposition and how it influenced manipulations of judicial authority. Zusammenfassung When judicial power appears to remain secure! what explains the recurrence of hostilities toward it? Addressing this question anew! Stephen Engel points to the gradual acceptance of dissenting views of the Constitution. This view of such a behavioral and ideational shift explains politicians' varying tactics to manipulate judicial authority. Inhaltsverzeichnis 1. Introduction: had Americans 'stopped understanding about the three branches'?; Part I. Political Development and Elected-Branch Relations with the Judiciary: 2. Beyond the countermajoritarian difficulty; 3. A developmental theory of political manipulation of judicial power; Part II. Hostility to Judicial Authority and the Political Idiom of Civic Republicanism: 4. In the cause of unified governance: undermining the court in an anti-party age; 5. Party against partisanship: single-party constitutionalism and the quest for regime unity; 6. 'As party exigencies require': republicanism, loyal opposition, and the emerging legitimacy of multiple constitutional visions; Part III. Harnessing Judicial Power and the Political Idiom of Liberal Pluralism: 7. Clashing progressive solutions to the problem of judicial authority; 8. In a polity fully-developed for harnessing (I): living constitutionalism and the policization of judicial appointment; 9. In a polity fully-developed for harnessing (II): a conservative insurgency and a self-styled majoritarian court responds; 10. Conclusion: on the 'return' of opposition illegitimacy and the prospects for new development....
