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Zusatztext ... the book is a fine set of essays; all of the contributions are clear and thoughtful, and most of them are powerful./ Virtually every essay in the volume is deserving of detailed comments. A brief review can do no more than touch on a few points./ ... an important and sophisticated contribution to contemporary jurisprudence./ ... for anyone interested in legal philosophy rather than in charlatanry, the book can be recommended very highly indeed./ Matthew H. Kramer, The Cambridge Law Journal, 1998. Klappentext Interest in interpretation has emerged in recent years as one of the main intellectual paradigms of legal scholarship. This collection of new essays in law and interpretation provides the reader with an overview of this important topic! written by some of the most distinguished scholars in the field. The book begins with interpretation as a general method of legal theorizing! and thus provides critical assessment of the recent "interpretative turn" in jurisprudence. Further chapters include essays on the nature of interpretation! its objectivity! the possible determinacy of legal standards! and their nature. Concluding with a series of articles on the role of legislative intent in the interpretation of statutes! this work offers new and refreshing insights into this old controversy. Zusammenfassung This collection of essays in law and interpretation provides an overview of the topic. The collection assesses the role of legislative intent in the interpretation of statues, and the determinacy of legal standards. This collection will appeal not only to lawyers and legal theorists but also to all scholars in legal discourse. Inhaltsverzeichnis Foreword I. Interpretation and Method in Legal Theory 1: M.S. Moore: Interpreting Interpretation 2: M. Stone: Focusing the Law: What Legal Interpretation is Not 3: S.R. Perry: Interpretation and Methodology in Legal Theory 4: B. Bix: Questions in Legal Interpretation II. Interpretation, Objectivity, and Determinacy 5: J. Raz: Interpretation without Retrieval 6: A. Marmor: Three Concepts of Objectivity 7: J. Coleman and B. Leiter: Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority 8: L. Alexander and K. Kress: Against Legal Principles III. Interpretation and Legislative Intent 9: J. Waldron: Legislators' Intentions and Unintentional Legislation 10: L. Alexander: All or Nothing At All? The Intentions of Authorities and the Authority of Intentions 11: H.M. Hurd: Interpreting Authorities 12: M. Dan-Cohen: Interpreting Official Speech ...
