Ulteriori informazioni
Zusatztext Sinnott-Armstrong's aim is to determine whether, how, and to what extent our moral beliefs can be justified. His discussion of these issues is remarkably clear, thorough, and solid... Given its philosophical rigor and insight and the import of the issues it deals with, I highly recommend this book not solely to those interested in moral epistemology but to anyone concerned with epistemology in general. Informationen zum Autor Walter Sinnott-Armstrong is Professor of Philosophy, Dartmouth College Klappentext Sinnott-Armstrong here provides an extensive survey of the difficult subject of moral beliefs. He covers theories that grapple with questions of morality such as naturalism, normativism, intuitionism, and coherentism. He then defends his own theory that he calls "moderate moral skepticism," which is that moral beliefs can be justified, but not extremely justified. Zusammenfassung Sinnott-Armstrong here provides an extensive survey of the difficult subject of moral beliefs. He covers theories that grapple with questions of morality such as naturalism! normativism! intuitionism! and coherentism. He then defends his own theory that he calls "moderate moral skepticism!" which is that moral beliefs can be justified! but not extremely justified. Inhaltsverzeichnis Part I: Issues 2: Are Moral Beliefs Truth-Apt? 3: Are Any Moral Beliefs True? 4: Are Any Moral Beliefs Justified? 5: In Contrast with What? 6: Classy Moral Pyrrhonism Part II: Theories 7: Naturalism 8: Normativism 9: Intuitionism 10: Coherentism
