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Zusatztext This excellent and wide ranging collecton of papers contains important and original contributions to the key current debate about the nature and extent of a subject's knowledge of the content of her thoughts and utterances ... This collection constitutes a key resource for those interested in the nature of a subject's knowledge of the content of her thoughts and utterances ... the collection is useful in challenging some of the traditional assumptions about self-knowledge ... For those interested in the compatability of externalism and privileged access, the collection contains new contributions on this topic which will undoubtedly be key to the on-going debate in this area. Klappentext Self-knowledge is the focus of considerable attention from philosophers: Knowing Our Own Minds gives a much-needed overview of current work on the subject, bringing together new essays by leading figures. Knowledge of one's own sensations, desires, intentions, thoughts, beliefs, and other attitudes is characteristically different from other kinds of knowledge, such as knowledge of other people's mental attributes: it has greater immediacy, authority, and salience. The first six chapters examine philosophical questions raised by these features of self-knowledge. The next two look at the role of our knowledge of our own psychological states in our functioning as rational agents. The third group of essays examine the tension between the distinctive characteristics of self-knowledge and arguments that psychological content is externally--socially and environmentally--determined. The final pair of chapters extend the discussion to knowledge of one's own language. Together these original, stimulating, and closely interlinked essays demonstrate the special relevance of self-knowledge to a broad range of issues in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language. Zusammenfassung Self-knowledge is the focus of considerable attention from philosophers: Knowing Our Own Minds gives a much-needed overview of current work on the subject, bringing together new essays by leading figures. Knowledge of one's own sensations, desires, intentions, thoughts, beliefs, and other attitudes is characteristically different from other kinds of knowledge, such as knowledge of other people's mental attributes: it has greater immediacy, authority, and salience. The first six chapters examine philosophical questions raised by these features of self-knowledge. The next two look at the role of our knowledge of our own psychological states in our functioning as rational agents. The third group of essays examine the tension between the distinctive characteristics of self-knowledge and arguments that psychological content is externally--socially and environmentally--determined. The final pair of chapters extend the discussion to knowledge of one's own language. Together these original, stimulating, and closely interlinked essays demonstrate the special relevance of self-knowledge to a broad range of issues in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language. Inhaltsverzeichnis Introduction; 1: Crispin Wright: Self-Knowledge: The Wittgensteinian Legacy 2: John McDowell: Response to Crispin Wright 3: Christopher Peacocke: Conscious Attitudes, Attention, and Self-Knowledge 4: M. G. F. Martin: An Eye Directed Outward 5: Cynthia Macdonald: Externalism and Authoritative Self-Knowledge 6: Elizabeth Fricker: Self-Knowledge: Special Access versus Artefact of Grammar--A Dichotomy Rejected 7: Akeel Bilgrami: Self-Knowledge and Resentment 8: Tyler Burge: Reason and the First Person 9: Paul A. Boghossian: What the Externalist Can Know A Priori [**this chapter previously published**] 10: Brian P. McLaughlin and Michael Tye: Externalism, Twin Earth, and Self-Knowledge 11: Martin Davies: Externalism, Architecturalism, and Epistemic Warrant 12: Diana Raffman: First-Pe...
