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Informationen zum Autor Christopher Adolph is Assistant Professor of Political Science and Adjunct Assistant Professor of Statistics at the University of Washington, Seattle, where he is also a core member of the Center for Statistics and the Social Sciences. He is a former Robert Wood Johnson Scholar in Health Policy Research and won the American Political Science Association's Mancur Olson Award for the best dissertation in political economy. His research on comparative political economy and quantitative methods has appeared in the American Political Science Review, Political Analysis, Social Science and Medicine and other academic journals. Klappentext Adolph illustrates the policy differences between central banks run by former bankers relative to those run by bureaucrats. Zusammenfassung Economists emphasize the role central banks' independence plays in achieving good economic outcomes. Using game theory and data from dozens of countries! Adolph illustrates that central bankers with different career trajectories choose different monetary policies. Central banks run by former bankers favor low inflation! whereas bureaucrats support low unemployment. Inhaltsverzeichnis 1. Agents, institutions, and the political economy of performance; 2. Career theories of monetary policy; 3. Careers and inflation in industrial democracies; 4. Careers and the monetary policy process; 5. Careers and inflation in developing countries; 6. The uses of autonomy: what independence really means; 7. Partisan governments, labor unions, and monetary policy; 8. The politics of central banker appointment; 9. The politics of central banker tenure; 10. Conclusion: the dilemma of discretion.
