Social Choice and the Mathematics of Manipulation

Klappentext A mathematical look at why it is impossible to devise a completely unmanipulable voting system, first published in 2005. Zusammenfassung Learn why it is impossible to devise a reasonable voting system in which voters can never gain by submitting a disingenuous ballot. Using minimal prerequisites! in this 2005 book Alan Taylor presents economic! philosophic! and mathematical results from the last quarter of the twentieth century! with many new proofs. Inhaltsverzeichnis 1. Introduction; 2. The Gibbard¿Satterthwaite theorem; 3. Additional results for single-valued elections; 4. The Duggan¿Schwartz theorem; 5. Additional results for multi-valued elections; 6. Ballots that rank sets; 7. Elections with outcomes that are lotteries; 8. Elections with variable agendas; References; Index.

Dettagli sul prodotto

• Autori: Alan D Taylor, Alan D. Taylor, Alan D. (Union College Taylor
• Con la collaborazione di: John Barrow (Editore), Ronald Graham (Editore)
• Editore: Cambridge University Press Academic
• Lingue: Inglese
• Formato: Copertina rigida
• Pubblicazione: 09.05.2005
• EAN: 9780521810524
• ISBN: 978-0-521-81052-4
• Dimensioni: 160 mm x 235 mm x 18 mm
• Serie: Outlooks; Outlooks
• Categorie: Libri scolastici > Didattica > Formazione professionale; Scienze naturali, medicina, informatica, tecnica > Matematica > Tematiche generali, enciclopedie