Amateur Strategist - Intuitive Deterrence Theories Politics of Nuclear Arms Race

Klappentext This is one of the most interesting contributions to nuclear deterrence theory. It is a fascinating study of how real people--experts and nonexperts--think about nuclear deterrence and arms control. The similarities and differences between expert and nonexpert opinion are very provocative. Zusammenfassung This book! first published in 1995! explores how the everyday person reasons about nuclear strategy. James DeNardo's discovery that the amateur's strategic reasoning defies all conventional theories lays the groundwork for a new understanding of national security politics! and challenges the intellectual foundations of modern deterrence theory! public opinion studies! and game theory. Inhaltsverzeichnis 1. Introduction; 2. A primer on the Cold War nuclear debate; 3. An introduction to intuitive deterrence theories; 4. Competing hypotheses about nuclear thinking; 5. The novice strategists; 6. The intuitive calculus of nuclear deterrence; 7. Statistical tests of the intuitive nuclear calculus; 8. Expert nuclear reasoning; 9. The factional politics of strategy and the end of the Cold War arms race; 10. Nuclear thinking after the cold war.

Dettagli sul prodotto

• Autori: James DeNardo
• Con la collaborazione di: Dennis Chong (Editore), James H. Kuklinski (Editore)
• Editore: Cambridge University Press ELT
• Lingue: Inglese
• Formato: Tascabile
• Pubblicazione: 25.08.1995
• EAN: 9780521484466
• ISBN: 978-0-521-48446-6
• Pagine: 332
• Serie: Cambridge Studies in Political
• Categoria: Scienze sociali, diritto, economia > Scienze politiche > Scienze politiche e cittadinanza attiva