Two-Sided Matching - A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis

Sommario

Foreword Robert Auman; Acknowledgment; 1. Introduction; Part I. One-To-One Matching: the Marriage Model: 2. Stable matchings; 3. The structure of the set of stable matchings; 4. Strategic questions; Part II. Many-To-One Matching: Models in which Firms May Employ Many Workers: 5. The college admissions model and the labor market for medical interns; 6. Discrete models with money, and more complex preferences; Part III. Models of One-To-One Matching with Money as a Continuous Variable: 7. A simple model of one seller and many buyers; 8. The assignment game; 9. The generalization of the assignment model; Part IV. Epilogue: 10. Open questions and research directions; Bibliography; Indexes.

Riassunto

Two-sided matching provides a model of search processes such as those between firms and workers in labor markets or between buyers and sellers in auctions. This text provides a comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching.

Dettagli sul prodotto

• Autori: Econometric Society, Alvin E. Roth, Alvin E. Sotomayor Roth, Marilda A. Sotomayor, Marilda A. Oliveira Sotomayor
• Con la collaborazione di: Andrew Chesher (Editore)
• Editore: Cambridge University Press ELT
• Lingue: Inglese
• Formato: Tascabile
• Pubblicazione: 26.06.1992
• EAN: 9780521437882
• ISBN: 978-0-521-43788-2
• Pagine: 280
• Serie: Econometric Society Monographs; Econometric Society Monographs
• Categorie: Guide e manuali > Diritto, professione, finanze; Scienze sociali, diritto, economia > Economia > Altro