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Informationen zum Autor Mark Dincecco is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan. His research and teaching interests include political economy, economic and political history, comparative politics, and public finance. He holds a PhD in economics from the University of California, Los Angeles, and has published in several academic journals. Klappentext Mark Dincecco examines the long-term evolution of political regimes and public finances in Europe. 'Mark Dincecco has set a keystone atop the new literature seeking to explain the stark international differences in the modern rise of government financial capacity. We have long wondered whether government centralization and limitations on executive power have shaped the ability to wage war and to invest in modern economic growth. Previous authors have been forced to narrate within smaller, more constrained contexts, in search of easy natural experiments. Dincecco takes advantage of the very historical breaks that have constrained others. His structural-breaks perspective neatly captures both the unique and the general effects of institutional shocks. The book will command attention among all social scientists seeking a deeper understanding of the political and historical sources of government fiscal crises.' Peter H. Lindert, Distinguished Research Professor of Economics, University of California, Davis 'In a pioneering work of political economy and economic history, Mark Dincecco analyzes how European states developed effective fiscal systems that could fund wars, pay for education and public works, and cut the risk on sovereign debt. The two essential steps were political centralization and limiting the power of absolute rulers, with most European states taking the first step during the French Revolution and the second one later in the nineteenth century. Dincecco tests his argument with nearly three centuries of magnificent quantitative data. The results will be of great interest to economists, historians, sociologists, and political scientists.' Philip T. Hoffman, Rea A. and Lela G. Axline Professor of Business Economics and Professor of History, California Institute of Technology 'This book conclusively establishes that it was the institutional innovations of state centralization and representative government that created the modern fiscal state in Europe. A fundamental work.' James A. Robinson, Harvard University Zusammenfassung This book examines the long-term evolution of political regimes and public finances in Europe. Using a novel combination of descriptive! case study and statistical methods! the book performs a systematic investigation of a new panel database that spans eleven countries and four centuries. Inhaltsverzeichnis 1. Weak and strong states in historical perspective; 2. Gaining force: from fragmentation to centralization; 3. Restricting power: from absolutism to limited government; 4. Political regimes and credit risk; 5. Two mechanisms; 6. Letting the data speak for themselves; 7. Estimating the fiscal effects of political regimes; 8. The institutional balance of modern fiscal states....
