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Informationen zum Autor Leonardo R. Arriola is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. He is the Vice Chair of the African Politics Conference Group, a research network affiliated with the American Political Science Association, for 2011-13. He has received grants and fellowships from the National Science Foundation; the Kellogg Institute for International Studies at Notre Dame; the Center for Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at Stanford; the Fulbright Program; and the US Department of Education. His work has appeared in journals such as Comparative Politics and Comparative Political Studies. He received the African Politics Conference Group's award for best article published on African politics in 2009. Klappentext Africa's long-ruling incumbents stay in power because opposition politicians struggle to secure the finances required to build electoral coalitions. Zusammenfassung Many claim that Africa's long-ruling incumbents are able to stay in power because opposition politicians are ethnically divided. However! the main challenge for opposition politicians is securing the money needed to build electoral coalitions. Financial reforms enable businesspeople to start providing money to the opposition without fear of punishment. Inhaltsverzeichnis 1. The puzzle of opposition coordination; 2. A theory of pecuniary coalition formation; 3. The emergence of financial reprisal regimes; 4. The political control of banking; 5. The liberalization of capital; 6. The political alignment of business; 7. Opposition bargaining across ethnic cleavages; 8. Multi-ethnic opposition coalitions in African elections; 9. Democratic consolidation in Africa.
