Fr. 55.50

Moral Realism

Inglese · Tascabile

Spedizione di solito entro 3 a 5 settimane

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Zusatztext This book is more than a good and useful introduction to arguments for and against moral realism. DeLapp offers a plausible and supportable realistic conception. I highly recommend this book to anyone who wants to become familiar with contemporary metaethical issues and the ways in which they can be solved while maintaining a robust moral realism as a lively option. Informationen zum Autor Kevin DeLapp is Harold E. Fleming Professor of Philosophy at Converse University, USA. He has published articles in the fields of metaethics, moral psychology, and cross-cultural philosophy, and he is the author of Moral Realism (2013) and Partial Values: A Comparative Study in the Limits of Objectivity (2018) and the co-editor of Lying and Truthfulness (2016). Klappentext Are moral values objective or are they relative to different cultural contexts and traditions? Do values have any place in a 'disenchanted' scientific conception of the world and, if so, how do human beings relate to such values culturally, psychologically, and epistemologically? This book examines contemporary responses to these questions. Moral Realism introduces students to contemporary debates concerning moral realism, including issues related to ethical naturalism, moral epistemology, moral motivation, cultural pluralism and moral disagreement. In the context of examining and connecting these different debates, the book presents its own unique form of moral realism according to which values may be belief-independent while also being characterized by an ontological pluralism that generates incommensurable moral disagreements and 'tragic' dilemmas. This idea serves as a guiding thread and also represents an attractive and neglected metaethical position in its own right. Specific attention is devoted to locating debates about moral realism in actual, embodied contexts, by looking to issues in experimental moral psychology, cross-cultiural anthropology and political science, permitting an accessible approach ideal for undergraduate students. Vorwort An accessible and original overview of contemporary debates in moral realism and relativism. Zusammenfassung Are moral values objective or are they relative to different cultural contexts and traditions? Do values have any place in a 'disenchanted' scientific conception of the world and, if so, how do human beings relate to such values culturally, psychologically, and epistemologically? This book examines contemporary responses to these questions. Moral Realism introduces students to contemporary debates concerning moral realism, including issues related to ethical naturalism, moral epistemology, moral motivation, cultural pluralism and moral disagreement. In the context of examining and connecting these different debates, the book presents its own unique form of moral realism according to which values may be belief-independent while also being characterized by an ontological pluralism that generates incommensurable moral disagreements and 'tragic' dilemmas. This idea serves as a guiding thread and also represents an attractive and neglected metaethical position in its own right. Specific attention is devoted to locating debates about moral realism in actual, embodied contexts, by looking to issues in experimental moral psychology, cross-cultiural anthropology and political science, permitting an accessible approach ideal for undergraduate students. Inhaltsverzeichnis Preface \ 1. Introduction \ 2. The Semantics of Realism \ 3. The Metaphysics of Realism \ 4. The Anthropology of Realism \ 5. The Psychology of Realism \ 6. The Epistemology of Realism \ 7. The Applications of Realism \ Glossary \ Further Reading \ Index...

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