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How has prudential supervision to be
conceived and organized for an
emerging single financial market ?
This is the concern of the present
book which consists in a report
prepared by an international group of
experts chaired by Professor Jean-Victor
Louis and working in the
framework of the ECU Institute, based
in Lyon.
What are the objectives of prudential
control ? Does the new situation deriving
from the Single Market directives
and the perspective of the Monetary
Union require to supplement and coordinate
the existing system of supervision
- a "patchwork of tradition" - in
the Member States ? What are the
possible orientations to recommend ?
In this book - which includes in a
second part reports on the organization
of prudential control in each of the
twelve Member States, before the
widening of the Union, and a report
on the United States - the authors
explain why they consider that the
application of the primary responsibility
for solvency questions of the
authorities of the Home Country of the
institutions, completed by a network
of (bilateral) co-operation between
authorities, is not possibly able to
guarantee the systemic stability which
is the main target of supervision, the
risks being increased by the
expansion of activities at continental
dimensions. They believe that some
measure of centralization is needed,
and therefore compatible with the
principle of subsidiarity. This centralization
is requested as far as legislation
and regulation are concerned but
direct responsibilities for the control of
larger banks can also be placed in
the hands of a central authority. The
Maastricht Treaty gives some limited
powers and provides for a possible
transfer of competences to the
European Central Bank. However, the
report which states the arguments in
favor and against concentration of
prudential supervision in the hands of
a central bank does not exclude the
possibility of creating a specialized
authority which could have a larger
horizontal competence (conglomerates,
securities, insurances) than a
central bank. It would be useful to
introduce in the treaty at the Intergovernmental
Conference of 1996, an
enabling clause which would provide
for the possible creation of such a
specialized authority which should
work hand in hand with the European
Central Bank.
