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Zusatztext “Authoritative. . . . A seminal work. . . . Williams’s assessment of Lincoln’s military prowess has never been seriously challenged.” — The Washington Post “Fascinating. . . . A full-bodied! swift-paced narrative. . . . The reader will gain as clear and shrewd an overall comprehension of the Northern effort from this volume as from any other in print.” —Allan Nevins! Saturday Review “Convincing. . . . As a story-teller [Williams] displays a craftsmanship that holds the reader in suspense even when he knows exactly how the incident ends.” — The New York Times “An admirably planned and executed work which well fulfills the author’s expressed hope that it will contribute both to the history and to the understanding of the American system.” — American Historical Review Informationen zum Autor T. Harry Williams was born in Vinegar Hill, Illinois, in 1909. He taught at the universities of Wisconsin, Omaha, and West Virginia before becoming Professor of History of Louisiana State University, and was the author of many books on military and political history. The T. Harry Williams Center for Oral History was established at Louisiana State University in 1992. Klappentext Since it was first published in 1952, Lincoln and His Generals has remained one of the definitive accounts of Lincoln's wartime leadership. In it T. Harry Williams dramatizes Lincoln's long and frustrating search for an effective leader of the Union Army and traces his transformation from a politician with little military knowledge into a master strategist of the Civil War. Explored in depth are Lincoln's often fraught relationships with generals such as McClellan, Pope, Burnside, Hooker, Fremont, and of course, Ulysses S. Grant. In this superbly written narrative, Williams demonstrates how Lincoln's persistent "meddling" into military affairs was crucial to the Northern war effort and utterly transformed the president's role as commander-in-chief. Chapter 1 The Pattern of Command The Civil War was the first of the modern total wars, and the American democracy was almost totally unready to fight it. The United States had in 1861 almost no army, few good weapons, no officers trained in the higher art of war, and an inadequate and archaic system of command. Armies could be raised and weapons manufactured quickly, but it took time and battles to train generals. And it took time and blunders and bitter experiences to develop a modern command system. Not until 1864 did the generals and the system emerge. In 1861 the general in chief of the army, which at the beginning of the war numbered about 16,000 men, was Winfield Scott. He was a veteran of two wars and the finest soldier in America. But he had been born in 1786, and he was physically incapable of commanding an army in the field. He could not ride, he could not walk more than a few steps without pain, and he had dropsy and vertigo.1 The old General dreamed wistfully of taking the field. "If I could only mount a horse, I–" he would say sadly and pause, "but I am past that."2 He was one of two officers in the army as the war started who had ever commanded troops in numbers large enough to be called an army. The other was John E. Wool, who was two years older than Scott. Wool had been a good soldier in his time, but he too showed the effects of age. He repeated things he had said a few minutes before, his hands shook, and he had to ask his aides if he had put his hat on straight.3 Besides Scott and Wool, not an officer in the North had directed the evolutions of as large a unit as a brigade.4 The largest single army that most of the younger officers had ever seen was Scott's force of 14,000 in the Mexican War. There was not an officer in the first year of the war who was capable of efficiently administering and fighting a large army. Even Scott, had he been yo...
