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Zusatztext ...the greatest contribution of this marvelous book lies in Antony Duff's elegant and arresting vision of criminal law's conceptual foundation…magnificent.. Informationen zum Autor Antony Duff is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Stirling. He is the author of numerous works on general philosophy, on the philosophy of law, and most particularly on the philosophy of crime and punishment. Klappentext This is the paperback edition of Antony Duff's acclaimed new work on the structures of criminal law and criminal liability. His starting point is a distinction between responsibility (understood as answerability) and liability, and a conception of responsibility as relational and practice-based. This focus on responsibility, as a matter of being answerable to those who have the standing to call one to account, throws new light on a range of questions in criminal law theory: on the question of criminalisation, which can now be cast as the question of what we should have to answer for, and to whom, under the threat of criminal conviction and punishment; on questions about the criminal trial, as a process through which defendants are called to answer, and about the conditions (bars to trial) given which a trial would be illegitimate; on questions about the structure of offences, the distinction between offences and defences, and the phenomena of strict liability and strict responsibility; and on questions about the structures of criminal defences. The net result is not a theory of criminal law; but it is an account of the structure of criminal law as an institution through which a liberal polity defines a realm of public wrongdoing, and calls those who perpetrate (or are accused of perpetrating) such wrongs to account. Zusammenfassung In this long-awaited book, Antony Duff offers a new perspective on the structures of criminal law and criminal liability. His starting point is a distinction between responsibility (understood as answerability) and liability, and a conception of responsibility as relational and practice-based. This focus on responsibility, as a matter of being answerable to those who have the standing to call one to account, throws new light on a range of questions in criminal law theory: on the question of criminalisation, which can now be cast as the question of what we should have to answer for, and to whom, under the threat of criminal conviction and punishment; on questions about the criminal trial, as a process through which defendants are called to answer, and about the conditions (bars to trial) given which a trial would be illegitimate; on questions about the structure of offences, the distinction between offences and defences, and the phenomena of strict liability and strict responsibility; and on questions about the structures of criminal defences. The net result is not a theory of criminal law; but it is an account of the structure of criminal law as an institution through which a liberal polity defines a realm of public wrongdoing, and calls those who perpetrate (or are accused of perpetrating) such wrongs to account. Inhaltsverzeichnis INTRODUCTION1. RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY2. CRIMINALLY RESPONSIBLE AS WHAT, TO WHOM?3. RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT?4. CRIMINALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT? (1) CRIMES AS WRONGS5. CRIMINALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT? (2) ACTION AND CRIME6. CRIMINALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT? (3) HARMS, WRONGS AND CRIMES7. STRUCTURES OF CRIME: ATTACKS AND NDANGERMENTS8. ANSWERING AND REFUSING TO ANSWER9. OFFENCES, DEFENCES AND THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE10. STRICT LIABILITY AND STRICT RESPONSIBILITY11. UNDERSTANDING DEFENCES...
