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Informationen zum Autor Jon Moran is Reader in Criminal Justice at the School of Legal Studies, University of Wolverhampton Klappentext This timely and controversial book shows how crime, and the authorities' response to crime, became central to the peace process in Northern Ireland.At times, paramilitary activity threatened to destabilise the peace in Northern Ireland after 1998, but crime was central to maintaining capacity should the groups return to war. Over time, the reduction of crime was central to these groups' own attempts to reform and official judgements as to whether they were genuinely demobilising.The state's response to crime added controversy. Police reform produced the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and the new Organised Crime Task Force signalled the importance of crime control, but the Assets Recovery Agency, supposedly the 'magic bullet' for organised crime, misfired. Law enforcement was also deeply affected by the British state's response to paramilitary crime. By 2007, peace was apparently secure and paramilitaries were 'de-criminalising', but this often chaotic process was marked with questions about the British state's adherence to the rule of law.Incorporating first-hand research in the PSNI, the book will be of interest to general readers and scholars of Irish Studies, criminology, and British and comparative politics. Zusammenfassung This book examines the way in which the issue of crime! and the response of the authorities to it! became central to the peace process in Northern Ieland after 1998. -- . Inhaltsverzeichnis List of tablesAbbreviationsGlossaryPreface/acknowledgements1. Politics, policing and crime as an issue in Northern Ireland after the peace process2. The republican movement: politics, crime and transition 3. Loyalist paramilitaries: violence, crime and legitimacy4. 'Ordinary decent' organised and volume crime5. From RUC to PSNI. Police reform and modernisation6. Policing serious and volume crime7. Political policing? The Organised Crime Task Force and the Assets Recovery Agency8. Counter terrorist policing9. ConclusionBibliographyInterviewsIndex...
