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Zusatztext 'Tim Besley demonstrates how to analyze political agency in the intellectual middle ground left open in between the optimism of the traditional welfare-economics approach! and the pessimism of the traditional public-choice approach. The key to good government is institution design- in the best Federalist tradition- to improve incentives in policymaking and selection to public office. Quite simply! a great book by a great economist.' Informationen zum Autor Timothy Besley is Professor of Economics at the LSE and Director of the Suntory Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD) at the LSE. He is also a Research Fellow at the Institute for Fiscal Studies and the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR). He has acted as Co-Editor of the American Economic Review and Managing Editor of the Economic Journal. He is an elected member of the Council of the Royal Economic Society, the Econometric Society, and the European Economics Association. Klappentext What is good government? Why do some governments fail? How do you implement political accountability in practice? What incentives do you need to put in place to ensure that politicians and public servants act in the public interest and not their own? These questions and many more are addressed in Timothy Besley's intriguing Lindahl lectures. Zusammenfassung What is good government? Why do some governments fail? How do you implement political accountability in practice? What incentives do you need to put in place to ensure that politicians and public servants act in the public interest and not their own? These questions and many more are addressed in Timothy Besley's intriguing Lindahl lectures. Inhaltsverzeichnis 1 Competing Views of Government The issues This book Background Economic Policy Making Political Economy Incentives and Selection in Politics Concluding Comments 2 The Anatomy of Government Failure Introduction Three Notions of Government Failure The Basic Model Government Failure Democratic Political Failures A Dynamic Model Government Failure in the Dynamic Model Responses to Political Failure Concluding Comments 3 Political Agency and Accountability Introduction Elements of Political Agency Models The Baseline Model Extensions Discussion Concluding Comments 4 Political Agency and Public Finance Introduction The Model Three Scenarios Implications Restraining Government Debt and Deficits Governments versus NGOs Competence Conclusions ...
