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Zusatztext "The book is refreshingly straightforward in presentation." ---Michael D. Ramsey, Review of Politics Informationen zum Autor William G. Howell and Jon C. Pevehouse are associate professors at the University of Chicago's Irving B. Harris School of Public Policy. Howell is the author of Power without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action (Princeton). Pevehouse is the author of, most recently, Democracy from Above Klappentext Nearly five hundred times in the past century, American presidents have deployed the nation's military abroad, on missions ranging from embassy evacuations to full-scale wars. The question of whether Congress has effectively limited the president's power to do so has generally met with a resounding "no." In While Dangers Gather, William Howell and Jon Pevehouse reach a very different conclusion. The authors--one an American politics scholar, the other an international relations scholar--provide the most comprehensive and compelling evidence to date on Congress's influence on presidential war powers. Their findings have profound implications for contemporary debates about war, presidential power, and Congress's constitutional obligations. While devoting special attention to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, this book systematically analyzes the last half-century of U.S. military policy. Among its conclusions: Presidents are systematically less likely to exercise military force when their partisan opponents retain control of Congress. The partisan composition of Congress, however, matters most for proposed deployments that are larger in size and directed at less strategically important locales. Moreover, congressional influence is often achieved not through bold legislative action but through public posturing--engaging the media, raising public concerns, and stirring domestic and international doubt about the United States' resolve to see a fight through to the end. Zusammenfassung Offers evidence on Congress' influence on presidential war powers. This book concludes that presidents are systematically less likely to exercise military force when their partisan opponents retain control of Congress. Inhaltsverzeichnis List of Figures vii List of Tables ix Preface xi Acknowledgments xxv Part One: Background and Theory 1 Chapter 1: Possibilities of Congressional Influence 3 Chapter 2: Conditions that Abet Congressional Influence 33 Part Two: Testing Claims about Congressional Influence 51 Chapter 3: Trends in Military Deployments 53 Chapter 4: Responding to "Opportunities" to Use Military Force (with Douglas L. Kriner) 75 Chapter 5: Studies in Domestic Politics and the Use of Force 114 Part Three: One Causal Pathway 153 Chapter 6: Congress and the Media (with Douglas L. Kriner) 155 Chapter 7: The Media and Public Opinion 192 Chapter 8: Conclusion 222 Appendix A: Tables Relating to Chapter 3 243 Appendix B: Text and Tables Relating to Chapter 4 245 Appendix C: Table Relating to Chapter 6 259 Appendix D: Table Relating to Chapter 7 260 Notes 263 References 307 Index 323 ...
