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Zusatztext 'Moral philosophers often engage in local skirmishes without awareness of the more generic strategies that they and their opponents are employing! without knowing that down the corridor colleagues from another field of philosophy are engaged in the same pattern of argument. Lillehammer draws attention to one such repeating pattern in theoretical ethics - the companions in guilt stratagem - and in this he has done metaethicists of all stripes a lasting service. Nobody! now! has an excuse for deploying such an argument without deliberating carefully about its structure and its merits. Lillehammer brings clarity to a complex and often messy debate; his thinking is well-informed! appropriately patient! and genuinely original.' - Richard Joyce! Professor of Philosophy! Australian National University 'I think all meta-ethicists should read this book.' - Andrew Fisher! The Philosophical Quarterly '...lucid! focused! and insightful...He has made a difficult job look easy.' - Terence Cuneo! Mind Informationen zum Autor HALLVARD LILLEHAMMER is Senior Lecturer in the Faculty of Philosophy at Cambridge University, UK, and a Fellow of King's College. He is co-editor of Real Metaphysics (2003) and Ramsey's Legacy (2005). Klappentext This is a systematic study of 'companions in guilt' arguments in moral philosophy. Lillehammer distinguishes between two distinct forms of these, which he calls 'arguments by entailment' and 'arguments by analogy' respectively. For each strategy, Lillehammer examines three of its most prominent manifestations in contemporary ethical thought. Zusammenfassung This is a systematic study of 'companions in guilt' arguments in moral philosophy. Lillehammer distinguishes between two distinct forms of these! which he calls 'arguments by entailment' and 'arguments by analogy' respectively. For each strategy! Lillehammer examines three of its most prominent manifestations in contemporary ethical thought. Inhaltsverzeichnis Companionship in Guilt Value, Normativity and the Mind The Normativity of Practical Reason Fact, Value and Truth Values and Secondary Qualities Ethics, Science and the Absolute Conception Ethical Objectivity and Rule Following Objectivity, Relativism and Inescapability Index...
List of contents
Companionship in Guilt Value, Normativity and the Mind The Normativity of Practical Reason Fact, Value and Truth Values and Secondary Qualities Ethics, Science and the Absolute Conception Ethical Objectivity and Rule Following Objectivity, Relativism and Inescapability Index
Report
'Moral philosophers often engage in local skirmishes without awareness of the more generic strategies that they and their opponents are employing, without knowing that down the corridor colleagues from another field of philosophy are engaged in the same pattern of argument. Lillehammer draws attention to one such repeating pattern in theoretical ethics - the companions in guilt stratagem - and in this he has done metaethicists of all stripes a lasting service. Nobody, now, has an excuse for deploying such an argument without deliberating carefully about its structure and its merits. Lillehammer brings clarity to a complex and often messy debate; his thinking is well-informed, appropriately patient, and genuinely original.' - Richard Joyce, Professor of Philosophy, Australian National University
'I think all meta-ethicists should read this book.' - Andrew Fisher, The Philosophical Quarterly
'...lucid, focused, and insightful...He has made a difficult job look easy.' - Terence Cuneo, Mind
