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This volume constitutes the refereed proceedings of 18th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2025, held in Bath, UK, during September 2 5, 2025.
The 26 full papers included in this book were carefully reviewed and selected from 68 submissions. They were organized in topical sections as follows:Computational and Algorithmic Aspects of Games; Facility Location; Fair Division and Resource Allocation; Markets and Matching; Bayesian Decision Making; Mechanism Design and Algorithmic Contracts and Computational Social Choice.
List of contents
.- Computational and Algorithmic Aspects of Games.
.- On the Limitations and Possibilities of Nash Regret Minimization inZero-Sum Matrix Games under Noisy Feedback.
.- On the Effect of Time Preferences on the Price of Anarchy.
.- Mixed Nash Equilibria in Discrete Tullock Contests.
.- Social Welfare in Battery Charging Games.
.- Improved Hardness Results for the Clearing Problem in Financial Networks with Credit Default Swaps.
.- Coordination Mechanisms on Unrelated Machines with Arbitrary Priority Lists.
.- Facility Location.
.- Constant-Approximate and Constant-Strategyproof Two-Facility Location.
.- Constrained Truthful Obnoxious Two-Facility Location with Optional Preferences.
.- Hotelling-Downs with Facility Synergy: The Mall Effect.
.- Fair Division and Resource Allocation.
.- Tractable Graph Structures in EFX Orientation.
.- Fairness under Equal-Sized Bundles: Impossibility results and Approximation Guarantees.
.- Online Fair Division for Personalized 2-Value Instances.
.- A new lower bound for multi-color discrepancy with applications to fair division.
.- When is Truthfully Allocating Chores no Harder than Goods?.
.- Markets and Matching.
.- Unsolvability and Beyond in Many-To-Many Non-Bipartite Stable Matching.
.- Course Allocation with Credits via Stable Matching.
.- Bayesian Decision Making.
.- Bayesian Optimal Stopping with Maximum Value Knowledge.
.- Persuading Agents in Opinion Formation Games.
.- A Truthful and Accurate Forecasting Competition Mechanism on Bayesian Network Structured Events.
.- Mechanism Design and Algorithmic Contracts.
.- Deterministic Refund Mechanisms.
.- Near-Linear MIR Algorithms for Stochastically-Ordered Priors.
.- Online Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design with Predictions.
.- Linear Contracts for Supermodular Functions Based on Graphs.
.- Computational Social Choice.
.- Distortion of Multi-Winner Elections on the Line Metric: The Polar Comparison Rule.
.- Metric Distortion under Group-Fair Objectives.
.- Robustness of voting mechanisms to external information.
