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Drawing on current research, this book demonstrates that there are rational reasons for why certain actions should reasonably not be considered duties despite their moral value. Would you do something unpleasant or dangerous you are not obliged to, simply because it would benefit others? “I won't do this because I don't have to”. This argument of supererogation can be used to reject overly demanding moral expectations. Yet, the argument is not always equally convincing. For instance, refusing to donate a kidney is morally accepted. Refusing a favor to a friend, however, seems indecent. Perhaps supererogatory acts do not exist at all? This book offers a refined framework for understanding the boundaries of moral duty. It is of interest to students and scholars of moral philosophy, applied ethics and meta ethics.
The translation was done with the help of artificial intelligence. A subsequent human revision was done primarily in terms of content.
List of contents
Preface.- Part I: Open Questions. An Introduction.- 1. Overview.- 2. The Delimitation Function of the Argument of Supererogation.- Part II: The Paradox of Supererogation in Supererogation Research (P1). A History of the Concept.- 3. Historical Review.- 4. Deontology and Categories.- 5. Utilitarianism and Cost-Benefit Analysis.- 6. Virtue Ethics and Talents.- 7. Rationalism and Reasons.- Part III: Two Types of Supererogations (P2-P5). A Theory of Supererogation.- 8. Moral Value (P2).- 9. Ultraerogations, Decencyerogations, and Pseudoerogations (P3).- 10. The Voluntariness of Supererogations (P4).- 11. The Omission of Supererogations (P5).- 12. Solutions and Outlooks.
About the author
Marie-Luise Raters is an adjunct professor of ethics, ethics education, aesthetics, and philosophy of religion at the Institute for Life Orientation – Ethics – Religious Studies (LER) and at the Institute of Philosophy at the University of Potsdam.
Summary
Drawing on current research, this book demonstrates that there are rational reasons for why certain actions should reasonably not be considered duties despite their moral value. Would you do something unpleasant or dangerous you are not obliged to, simply because it would benefit others? “I won't do this because I don't have to”. This argument of supererogation can be used to reject overly demanding moral expectations. Yet, the argument is not always equally convincing. For instance, refusing to donate a kidney is morally accepted. Refusing a favor to a friend, however, seems indecent. Perhaps supererogatory acts do not exist at all? This book offers a refined framework for understanding the boundaries of moral duty. It is of interest to students and scholars of moral philosophy, applied ethics and meta ethics.
