Read more
Informationen zum Autor Strachan, Hew Klappentext This is a fascinating new insight into the British army and its evolution through both large and small scale conflicts. To prepare for future wars, armies derive lessons from past wars. However, some armies are defeated because they learnt the wrong lessons, fighting new conflicts in ways appropriate to the last. For the British Army in the twentieth century, the challenge has been particularly great. It has never had the luxury of emerging from one major European war with the time to prepare itself for the next. The leading military historians show how ongoing commitments to a range of 'small wars' have always been part of the Army's experience. After 1902 and after 1918 they included colonial campaigns, but they also developed into what we would now call counter-insurgency operations, and these became the norm between 1945 and 1969. During the height of the Cold War, in 1982, the Army was deployed to the Falklands. Since 1990 the dominant tasks of the Army have been peace support operations. This is an excellent resource for all students and scholars of military history, politics and international relations and British history. Zusammenfassung This book examines how in the twentieth century the British army learnt lessons from past wars, both large and small, in order to prepare for the future. Inhaltsverzeichnis Introduction 1. Between the South African War and the First World War, 1902-14 2. Big Wars and Small Wars between the Wars, 1919-39 3. Learning New Lessons: The British Army and the Strategic Debate, 1945-50 4. Lost and Found in the Jungle: The Indian and British Army Jungle Warfare Doctrines for Burma, 1943-45, and the Malayan Emergency, 1948-60 6. Aden to Northern Ireland, 1966-76 7. The Unchanging Lessons of Battle: The British Army and the Falklands War, 1982 8. The Gulf War, 1990-91
