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Political institutions have been depicted by academics as a marketplace where citizens transact with each other to accomplish collective ends difficult to accomplish otherwise. This depiction supports a romantic notion of democracy in which democratic governments are accountable to their citizens, and act in their best interests. In Politics as Exchange, Randall Holcombe explains why this view of democracy is too optimistic. He argues that while there is a political marketplace in which public policy is made, access to the political marketplace is limited to an elite few. A small group of well-connected individuals-legislators, lobbyists, agency heads, and others-negotiate to produce public policies with which the masses must comply. Examining the political transactions that determine policy, Holcombe discusses how political institutions, citizen mobility, and competition can limit the ability of elites to abuse their power.
List of contents
1. The political marketplace; 2. Market institutions; 3. Transaction costs and institutions; 4. The characteristics of authority; 5. The ruling class; 6. The institutional structure of the political marketplace; 7. Political transactions; 8. Interest groups: Elites and masses; 9. Welfare maximization, redistribution, and governance; 10. The scope of authority; 11. Mobility and authority; 12. Democracy and authority; 13. Constraining leviathan: competition among elites; 14. Politics as exchange.
About the author
Randall G. Holcombe is DeVoe Moore Professor of Economics at Florida State University. He is past president of the Public Choice Society and the Society for the Development of Austrian Economics. His previous books include Political Capitalism: How Economic and Political Power Is Made and Maintained (2018) and Following Their Leaders: Political Preferences and Public Policy (2023).
