Deterrence under Uncertainty - Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear Warfare

A practitioner's perspective on how artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies could change the role of nuclear weapons in international relations. Geist argues that artificial intelligence could make a huge impact on deterrence and strategic stability even if it does not render retaliatory forces vulnerable.

List of contents

• Introduction: Artificial Intelligence and the Nuclear Dilemma


• The Emerging Strategic Environment


• From Celluloid Nightmares to Silicon Realities


• No Place to Hide?


• Recipe for a WOPR


• Fog-of-War Machines


• Strategic Stability in a Deception-Dominant World


• Conclusion: A Case for (Tempered) Optimism


• Appendix A: The Mathematics of Tracking


• Appendix B: A Bayesian Perspective on Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception


• Appendix C: A Rudimentary Model of Ontological Confrontation


• Index

About the author

Edward Geist is a Senior Policy Researcher at the RAND Corporation, where his research interests include Russia (primarily defense policy), civil defense, artificial intelligence, nuclear weapons, and particularly the potential impact of emerging technologies on nuclear strategy. He is the author of Armageddon Insurance: Civil Defense in the United States and Soviet Union, 1945-1991 (University of North Carolina Press, 2019).

Product details

• Authors: Edward Geist
• Publisher: Oxford Academic
• Languages: English
• Product format: Paperback / Softback
• Release: 28.08.2025
• EAN: 9780198976127
• ISBN: 978-0-19-897612-7
• Subjects: Natural sciences, medicine, IT, technology > IT, data processing > IT; Artificial Intelligence, HISTORY / Military / Nuclear Warfare, Human-Computer Interaction, Nuclear weapons, Human–computer interaction, COMPUTERS / Human-Computer Interaction (HCI), COMPUTERS / Artificial Intelligence / General