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This book offers an innovative look at the Ottoman iltizam (tax-farming) system through the lens of historical inquiry and modern theory. Drawing from original archival research as well as theoretical frameworks such as principal-agent theory and game theory, this book explores how the Ottoman state managed revenue collection, delegated authority, and grappled with institutional constraints. The chapters guide readers through the evolution of tax farming from its historical roots and theoretical foundations to detailed case studies. Contributors examine fiscal capacity, state-building, credible commitment, and the unintended consequences of decentralization. The final chapters explore 19th-century constitutional reforms that changed the institutional designs of earlier periods and synthesize key findings. Essential for scholars of Ottoman history, economic history, political economy, and institutional change, this volume redefines how we understand state organization, economic transformation, and governance in non-Western contexts.
List of contents
CHAPTER 1. ON THE HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK PROJECT.- PART I. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TAXATION IN THE OTTOMAN PAST.- CHAPTER 2. INTRODUCTION: A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.- CHAPTER 3. CONCEPTUALIZATION OF OTTOMAN INSTITUTIONS: A BRIEF REVIEW FOR THEORETICAL ASSESSMENT OF TAX-FARMING CONTRACTS.- CHAPTER 4. A RESEARCH ON TAX-FARMING (ILTIZAM) CONTRACTS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE: THE CASE OF BOLU.- CHAPTER 5. CREDIBLE COMMITMENT OBSTACLES TO EARLY MODERN STATE-BUILDING: A SKEPTICAL OVERVIEW.- CHAPTER 6. THE DAWN OF 5TH DAY IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE: 19TH CENTURY CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATIONS.- PART II. THEORIZING TAXATION IN THE OTTOMAN PAST.- CHAPTER 7. INTRODUCTION: A THEORETICAL BACKGROUND.- CHAPTER 8. A GAME-THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF SOURCE ALLOCATION IN THE EARLY MODERN OTTOMAN EMPIRE UNDER CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS: CASE OF THESSALONIKI CUSTOMS.- CHAPTER 9. COORDINATION AND CONFLICT: A GAME-THEORETIC ASSESSMENT ON THE FISCAL CAPACITY THROUGH TAX-FARMING CONTRACTS IN THE EARLY MODERN OTTOMAN EMPIRE.- CHAPTER 10. CONCLUSION: TAX-FARMING AND ITS UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES.
About the author
Bora Altay is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Economics, Faculty of Political Sciences, Ankara Yildirim Beyazit University, Türkiye. His research focuses on the long-term development and economic performance of societies. He mostly concentrates on the tools of new institutional economics and gives particular attention to the Ottoman Empire and its institutions. In addition to research articles focused on Ottoman institutions, Dr. Altay is the author of the book Rules, Contracts, and Law Enforcement in the Ottoman Empire: The Case of Tax-Farming Contracts and a co-editor of the book Islamic Financial Institutions from the Early Modern Period to the 20th Century: Comparative Perspectives on the History and Development of Cash Waqfs, both published by Palgrave Macmillan.
Summary
This book offers an innovative look at the Ottoman iltizam (tax-farming) system through the lens of historical inquiry and modern theory.
Drawing from original archival research as well as theoretical frameworks such as principal-agent theory and game theory, this book explores how the Ottoman state managed revenue collection, delegated authority, and grappled with institutional constraints. The chapters guide readers through the evolution of tax farming from its historical roots and theoretical foundations to detailed case studies. Contributors examine fiscal capacity, state-building, credible commitment, and the unintended consequences of decentralization. The final chapters explore 19th-century constitutional reforms that changed the institutional designs of earlier periods and synthesize key findings. Essential for scholars of Ottoman history, economic history, political economy, and institutional change, this volume redefines how we understand state organization, economic transformation, and governance in non-Western contexts.
