World War II Battles Reconsidered - Game Theory and Decision Science Perspectives on Gazala, El Alamein, Falaise and Arnhem

"Written by a former Harvard professor of decision science and game theory, this book presents original insights on the strategies and tactics undertaken in four major battles of the Second World War. That the fighting at Gazala in Libya in the late spring of 1942 constituted what has been called "probably the most spectacular series of victories ever gained over a British army" was in part due to its having violated the game-theoretic Zero-Sum Maxim of Napoleon: "Do not do what your enemy wishes you to." The sensational British reversal of that disaster later that year at El Alamein in Egypt derived largely from heeding the millennia-old military priority of command unity, which has been analyzed and re-endorsed by modern decision science. This discipline has also judged the somewhat disappointing victory of the Allies at Falaise in France in August of 1944 to have resulted from excessive risk aversion-possibly induced by three different types of fatigue. One month later, the Allied setback at Arnhem in the Netherlands called into question, from the perspective of game theory, the value of battlefield surprise. These decisions, approached from an expert perspective on game theory and presented with high-quality maps, are presented in this pioneering application of decision science to the battles of World War II."--

List of contents

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments deletevi

Prologue

1.¿A Framework for Assessing Military Decisions

Rating Outcomes¿¿¿7; Factors Affecting Outcomes¿¿¿10; ­Meta-Decisions and Situational Factors¿¿¿11; Informational Decisions¿¿¿19; Strategic and Tactical Considerations¿¿¿26; Chapter Recapitulation: A Framework for Understanding and Assessing ­Meta-Decisions, Situational Factors, Informational Decisions, Strategic and Tactical Considerations, and Their Consequences¿¿¿40

2.¿Gazala

The Warring World¿¿¿45; ­Over-Promoted and ­Under-Competent: The ­Meta-Decision on Eighth Army Command at Gazalä¿¿51; "Lamentable" British Inaction "while the Russians were fighting desperately and valiantly": ­Pre-Battle Decisions¿¿¿53; Pushback to Prime Ministerial Pressure: Enabling the Axis to Move First¿¿¿55; "Seriously worried" Rommel: The Outcome of the First Two Days¿¿¿56; Baseless British Bravado, Stirring French Staunchness, and Annihilative German Efficiency: ­In-Battle Decisions Over ­Two-Plus Weeks¿¿¿57; "Tobruk must be held ... and I order you to do it": ­Late-Battle Decision Reversal¿¿¿60; "Defeat is one thing; disgrace is another": Rating the Outcome¿¿¿62; At Speed into Egypt Up to a Small Depot¿¿¿63; "Killing a magnificent stag": ­Meta-Decisions on British Commands¿¿¿65; Force Strengths¿¿¿67; "Ah, now we've got him": Confidence and Morale¿¿¿69; "Tell[ing] a chief ... the things he most likes to hear": Concentration, Reporting, Fatigue, and Luck¿¿¿71; "Rommel, Rommel, Rommel! What else matters but beating him!" ­Principal-Agent Disconnect¿¿¿73; Cowpats and Concentration: Rating the ­Meta-Decision on Eighth Army Command¿¿¿75; ­Meta-Decisional Query: Whose Was the "crowning blunder" That Lost 33,000 Commonwealth Soldiers at Tobruk to Captivity?¿¿¿77; "Barking out orders" versus "an awful lot of paperwork": ­Meta-Decisional Differences¿¿¿79; "Much resented": Organizational Behavior, Military Politics, and Commander Positioning¿¿¿80; "Cloud cuckoo land": Informational Delusion¿¿¿82; "Continued magnificent work": Informational Processes¿¿¿83; Negative Information Value: Misinterpretation¿¿¿85; Positive Information Value: The American Leak¿¿¿87; "But the bear blew first": ­Move-Order Decisions¿¿¿88; Deciding: Likelihoods, Values, and Aversions to Risk and Loss¿¿¿89; Conclusions¿¿¿90

3.¿El Alamein

Prodding for Mines in Moonlight with Bayonets¿¿¿92; The ­Zero-Sum Maxim of Napoleon Turned Around: Battle Decisions at El Alamein¿¿¿95; "With an insubordinate smile": Montgomery Comes to the Eighth Army¿¿¿99; "A queer little bloke": Rating the ­Meta-Decisional Command Changes¿¿¿100; "Our last chance of an offensive": ­Pre-Battle Decisions at Alam Halfä¿¿103; "The swine isn't attacking": ­Mid-Battle Decision at Alam Halfä¿¿105; "Our last chance of gaining the Suez Canal had gone": Results and Explanations¿¿¿107; Announcing the Imminent Axis Capture of Alexandria: The ­Lead-Up to October 23¿¿¿108; The Battle¿¿¿108; So Close to Full: "Ring the bells all over Britain for the first time this war"¿¿¿110; But Not Quite: The ­Cut-Short Cop¿¿¿111; Force Strengths: Pitchfork Against ­Tommy-Gun¿¿¿112; Probable Failure versus Assured Complete Victory: Framing the Decision on Attack Timing¿¿¿113; "Gnaw[ing] their way yard by yard": Battle Decisions of Montgomery¿¿¿115; "Military interests" versus "propaganda": Pre-and ­Mid-Battle Decisions of the Axis¿¿¿117; ­Post-Battle Decisions of Montgomery¿¿¿119; "Cautious-to my mind, excessively so": Rommel on Montgomery¿¿¿122; Was Montgomery Just "lucky ... to have such immense resources?": Eighth Army Upgrades¿¿¿123; "Complete chaos existed": Informational Advantage¿¿¿123; "Had we not got a single general who could even win one single battle?" Having Appropriate Resolution¿¿¿125; "As lost as a dray horse on a polo field": The Escape of Rommel's Army¿¿¿127; "So proud of his success to date": The Behavior Respecting Risk of Montgomery¿¿¿130; Conclusions¿¿¿131

4.¿Falaise

"Probably the most costly, controversial order given in the European theatre during World War Two"¿¿¿138; "A solid shoulder" or "a broken neck": The Decision of Bradley on August 13, 1944¿¿¿140; Throw Them Back "into the sea": The Counterattack through Mortain¿¿¿144; Bradley as ­Second-Mover: Reacting to the Attack of Hitler at Mortain¿¿¿145; "A kick up the fork": Decisions and ­Non-Decisions of Montgomery¿¿¿148; Force Destruction versus River Crossing: The Decision of Bradley of August 14¿¿¿150; The Outcome: "August 15 was the worst day of my [Hitler's] life"¿¿¿151; The Long and the Short of the Hooks¿¿¿154; A Clear Allied Triumph, If Not "the greatest achievement in military history," Yet One More Incomplete Cop: Rating the Outcome¿¿¿157; "Still comparatively virgin": Explaining the Outcome¿¿¿158; "Something altogether uprooted that wanders around": Rating the Decisions on the Counterattack¿¿¿160; "An arrogant slap in the face": Reasons for Bradley's Decision of August 13¿¿¿161; "Patton had to be saved from himself": Assessing a Major Reason for Bradley's Decision¿¿¿163; "Monty happily forgave us our trespasses": Assessing Other Justifications of Bradley's Decision¿¿¿164; "A great mistake": Rating Bradley's Decision of August 13¿¿¿166; "Squeezing the toothpaste": Rating the Decisions on the Northern Jaw¿¿¿167; "I still don't understand why the Allies did not crush us": Rating the Later Decisions¿¿¿168; "Who was responsible to whom": ­Meta-Decisional Muddling of Responsibility¿¿¿170; "Pay no attention to Monty's Goddamn boundaries": Coordinational Confusion¿¿¿172; "Egregiously wrong": Inconstant Information¿¿¿174; When Were the Allied Commanders Wrong?¿¿¿176; What Would Napoleon Have Done?¿¿¿177; Conclusions¿¿¿178

­Decision-Scientific Addendum to Chapter 4¿¿¿182

5¿Arnhem

We "simply stared, stunned, like fools"¿¿¿188; "Militarily the war is won": The Decision on Arnhem¿¿¿191; The First Week: The Planning Fallacy Again¿¿¿197; "I shall probably give it up": The Decision to Retreat¿¿¿199; "Few episodes more glorious" or Jumping Off a Cliff: Ratings of the Outcome¿¿¿201; Force Strengths¿¿¿202; "Unquestionably would have been successful": Luck¿¿¿203; "Steady, Monty.... I'm your boss": ­Meta-Decisions and Situational Factors¿¿¿205; "Fantastic" Thoughts of Berlin, "lust for glory," and Interpersonal Tension¿¿¿207; "Winc[ing]" in Recognition of Stiffened Enemy Resistance¿¿¿208; Those Photographed Tanks Must Need Servicing: Informational Interpretations¿¿¿210; The Underappreciated Alternative: Taking the Scheldt¿¿¿212; "Napoleon would no doubt have realized ... but Horrocks didn't": Informational Processes¿¿¿214; "Had the pious teetotaling Montgomery wobbled into [Allied headquarters] with a hangover, I could not have been more astonished": The Value of Surprise¿¿¿216; Choosing Among Alternatives: Was Arnhem, Indeed, a Bridge Too Far?¿¿¿218; Risk Aversion¿¿¿218; At a Crest at Brest: The ­Sunk-Cost Fallacy¿¿¿219; Concentration into "one really powerful and ­full-blooded thrust": Military Precepts Invoked¿¿¿223; Conclusions¿¿¿224

­Game-Theoretic Addendum to Chapter 5¿¿¿227¿¿¿Actual Strategic Choices¿¿¿231

Chapter Notes

Bibliography

Index

About the author

Mark Thompson was a full-time professor at Harvard University from 1975 to 1983 and has been a visiting professor at the Universite de Paris and the Universitat Bielefeld in North Rhine-Westphalia in Germany. He taught courses on decision science, game theory, and social program evaluation. He lives in Lexington, Massachusetts.

Product details

• Authors: Mark Thompson
• Publisher: McFarland and Company, Inc.
• Languages: English
• Product format: Paperback / Softback
• Released: 20.03.2025
• EAN: 9781476696737
• ISBN: 978-1-4766-9673-7
• No. of pages: 280
• Dimensions: 178 mm x 254 mm x 15 mm
• Weight: 532 g
• Subjects: Humanities, art, music > History > 20th century (up to 1945); Non-fiction book > History > Miscellaneous