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This volume explores the major moral theories and their distinctive approaches and controversial implications regarding sex. Despite being a commonplace human activity, contemporary discussions of the norms regarding sex-particularly those that connect with the major moral theories-are relatively rare. This volume shows that the relative silence is important, for all the major moral theories appear to have controversial implications about the morality and value of sex. Consequently, either widespread Western assumptions about sex are mistaken or else the major moral theories have serious problems when it comes to the ethics of the bedroom. Adopting a metaethical Mooreanism about our sexual intuitions offers a potential compromise, such that some of the more novel and controversial Western intuitions are abandoned with resulting room for at least one moral theory to remain viable.
List of contents
Introduction.- 1. Utilitarianism and the Perverse Obligation.- 2. Sex and Social Contracts.- 3. Kant and Neo-Kantian Sexual Ethics. 4. Sex and the Virtues.- 5. Natural Law and Natural Sex.- 6. The Moorean Meta-Argument.
About the author
Brian Besong is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Saint Francis University, USA.
Summary
This volume explores the major moral theories and their distinctive approaches and controversial implications regarding sex. Despite being a commonplace human activity, contemporary discussions of the norms regarding sex—particularly those that connect with the major moral theories—are relatively rare. This volume shows that the relative silence is important, for all the major moral theories appear to have controversial implications about the morality and value of sex. Consequently, either widespread Western assumptions about sex are mistaken or else the major moral theories have serious problems when it comes to the ethics of the bedroom. Adopting a metaethical Mooreanism about our sexual intuitions offers a potential compromise, such that some of the more novel and controversial Western intuitions are abandoned with resulting room for at least one moral theory to remain viable.
