Fr. 49.90

Stephen Hetherington on Epistemology

English · Paperback / Softback

Will be released 01.12.2025

Description

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Philosophy has long embraced epistemology as one of its central elements. What is knowledge? How do we gain it? Can we gain it? Or do we always deceive ourselves when thinking that we have knowledge? Are we too deeply fallible ever to know something? For centuries, these questions have helped to define and motivate epistemological research. This volume engages strikingly with them, offering some unusual answers. Stephen Hetherington''s prominent career within epistemology has been a series of bold, varied and provocative arguments and ideas. Bringing together some elements of his unique body of writing for the first time, this collection features previously published as well as new material displaying and extending some of his highly original approaches to key issues including knowledge, justification, fallibility, scepticism and the Gettier Problem. Advancing our understanding of the systemic nature of Hetherington''s thinking, Stephen Hetherington on Epistemology presents his distinctive perspective on some of philosophy''s central questions about knowledge - an inviting blend of forensic detail and ''big picture'' proposals.

Product details

Authors Stephen Hetherington
Assisted by Mark Anthony Dacela (Editor), Jeremiah Joven Joaquin (Editor)
Publisher Bloomsbury Academic
 
Languages English
Product format Paperback / Softback
Release 01.12.2025
 
EAN 9781350344952
ISBN 978-1-350-34495-2
No. of pages 256
Subjects Non-fiction book > Philosophy, religion > Philosophy: general, reference works

PHILOSOPHY / Epistemology, Philosophy: epistemology & theory of knowledge, Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge

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