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"George Tsebelis presents a theoretical argument and supporting empirical evidence on the inverse relationship between constitutional rigidity and the frequency and significance of amendments, as well as their variance. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core"--
List of contents
Foreword; Introduction; 1. The landscape of constitutional amendments; 2. An institutional approach to constitutional rigidity; 3. Cultural theories of constitutional amendments; 4. Cases of failed amendments: Italy and Chile; 5. A case of successful amendments: Mexico; 6. Constitutional rigidity and amendment rate; 7. Time inconsistency and other correlates of constitutional length; 8. Constitutional rigidity and judicial independence; Conclusions; Bibliography; Appendices.
About the author
George Tsebelis is the Anatol Rapoport Collegiate Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan where he works on political institutions. He is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and has received honorary degrees from the Universities of Athens, Crete and Milan. He is the author (among other books) of Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics (1991) and Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (2002).
Summary
George Tsebelis presents a theoretical argument and supporting empirical evidence on the inverse relationship between constitutional rigidity and the frequency and significance of amendments, as well as their variance. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Foreword
Demonstrates that constitutional rigidity is a necessary condition for the absence of frequent and significant constitutional amendments and judicial independence.
