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This volume considers forms of information manipulation and restriction in contemporary society, paying special attention to contemporary paternalistic practices in big data and scientific research, as the way in which the flow of information or knowledge might be curtailed by the manipulations of a small body of experts or algorithms.
List of contents
Introduction / Part I: Digital Paternalism and Open Societies / Artificial Ignorance? Epistemic Paternalism, Solidarity and Big Data John Stephen / 2. Epistemic Bubbles, Echo Champers and the Information and Communications Technologies Clinton Castro, Adam Pham, and Alan Rubel / 3. Deliberative Mini-Publics and the Problem of Blind Deference Alfred Moore / 4. Expert Advice for Decision-Making: the Moving Boundary Between Informing and Instructing Marion Worms / Part II: Scientific and Medical Communication / 5. Science, Communication, and Persuasion Fabien Medvecky / 6. Persuasion and Paternalism Robert Mckenna / 7. Medical Epistemic Paternalism Jim McBain / 8. Psychiatric Paternalism in Mental Health Care and Democratic Care Interventions Shaun Respess / 9. When Patients Enact Medical Epistemic Paternalism: "Expert" vs Ordinary Patients Aude Bandini / Part III: Epistemic Normativity / 10. Intellectual autonomy matters Jesus Vega-Encabo Epistemic Normativity and Epistemic Paternalism Pat Bondy / 11. Epistemic Paternalism, Personal Sovereignty, and One's Own Good Michel Croce / Epistemic Care and Epistemic Paternalism Fernando Broncano-Berrocal / 12. Epistemic Autonomy, Epistemic Paternalism, and Blindspots of Reason David Godden / Part IV: Epistemic In/justice, vice, and virtue / 13. Some Considerations Against Epistemic Paternalism: Risk, Virtues and Permissivism Liz Jackson / 14. Silencing, Epistemic Injustice, and Epistemic Paternalism Valerie Chock and Jon Matheson / 15. Epistemic Justice as Epistemic Paternalism Amiel Bernal / 16. Epistemic Paternalism and Epistemic Vice Daniella Meehan / 17. Paternalism and (non-)Violence: Epistemic Manifestations Adam Green / 18. Epistemic Justice and Respect for Erroneous Belief Shaun O'Dywer / Index
About the author
Guy Axtell is Professor of Philosophy at Radford University, working primarily in social epistemology, and philosophy of the sciences. His volume Knowledge, Belief, and Character (Rowman & Littlefield 2000) was the first edited collection in the area of virtue/vice epistemology; he has since published two monographs along with numerous articles.
Amiel Bernal received his Ph.D. from Virginia Tech's ASPECT Program (The Alliance for Social, Political, and Economic Thought). Currently he teaches at Virginia Military Institute and Radford University. His research focus is in social epistemology, epistemic injustice, and ethics.
