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In normative ethics, a small number of moral theories, such as Kantianism or consequentialism, take centre stage. Conventional wisdom has it that these individual theories posit very different ways of looking at the world. In this book Marius Baumann develops the idea that just as scientific theories can be underdetermined by data, so can moral theories be underdetermined by our considered judgments about particular cases. Baumann goes on to ask whether moral theories from different traditions might arrive at the same verdicts while remaining explanatorily incompatible. He applies this idea to recent projects in normative ethics, such as Derek Parfit's On What Matters and so-called consequentializing and deontologizing, and outlines its important implications for our understanding of the relationship between the main moral traditions as well as the moral realism debate. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
List of contents
Introduction; Part I. Scientific Underdetermination and the Analogy to Ethics: 1. Underdetermination in Science; 2. The analogy to the moral realm; Part II. Underdetermination in Normative Ethics: 3. Parfit and the case study of case studies; 4. Going algorithmic: consequentializing and deontologizing; 5. The big picture in normative ethics; Part III. Skepticism and a New Metaethical Position: 6. Skeptical repercussions; 7. A new position in metaethics; 8. Looking back and ahead; Bibliography; Index.
About the author
Marius Baumann is Academic Director of the Centre for Ethics and Philosophy in Practice at Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich. His articles have appeared in Synthese, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, and Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.
Summary
In normative ethics, a small number of moral theories, such as Kantianism or consequentialism, take centre stage. Conventional wisdom has it that these individual theories posit very different ways of looking at the world. In this book Marius Baumann develops the idea that just as scientific theories can be underdetermined by data, so can moral theories be underdetermined by our considered judgments about particular cases. Baumann goes on to ask whether moral theories from different traditions might arrive at the same verdicts while remaining explanatorily incompatible. He applies this idea to recent projects in normative ethics, such as Derek Parfit's On What Matters and so-called consequentializing and deontologizing, and outlines its important implications for our understanding of the relationship between the main moral traditions as well as the moral realism debate. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Foreword
This book, the first extended defence of moral underdetermination, challenges our understanding of the relationship between the main moral traditions.
