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Applying economic methods to the institutional, procedural, and substantive aspects of European law, this book offers a unique systematic economic analysis of EU law.
List of contents
- Part I. Basics
- 1: Meandering between rational choice, realism, constructivism, and institutionalism
- 2: A cursory review of economic methods
- Part II. Why Cooperate Through EU Law
- 3: What states and EU institutions care about
- 4: The logic of barter trade: Rational choice and constitutional economics
- 5: Reducing transaction costs
- 6: Supplying public goods and addressing external effects
- 7: Leveraging economies of scale
- 8: Why cooperation fails
- Part III. How to Cooperate Under EU Law
- 9: Membership of EU Treaties
- 10: Centralization
- 11: Flexibility
- 12: Non-consensual EU law
- 13: Legislative choices
- 14: Enforcement
- Part IV. Who Cooperates under EU Law
- 15: The European Council and Council of Ministers
- 16: The European Parliament
- 17: The European Court of Justice
- 18: The European Central Bank
- 19: The European Commission
- 20: Adjudication
- Part V. What to Cooperate on in the EU
- 21: European Public Goods
- 22: Internal market: economic integration
- 23: Economic and Monetary Union
About the author
Armin Steinbach holds the Jean Monnet Chair of Law and Economics, European Law, and International Law. He is also a visiting professor at the London School of Economics (LSE) and non-resident Fellow at Brussels-based think tank Bruegel. He previously served as a government official for more than ten years, heading the fiscal policy division in the German Ministry of Finance and the economic policy division in the Ministry of Economic and Energy Affairs. Armin sits on the WTO list of panellists serving the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.
Summary
Applying economic methods to the institutional, procedural, and substantive aspects of European law, this book offers a unique systematic economic analysis of EU law.
Additional text
In this insightful volume, Armin Steinbach provides an innovative, coherent, and satisfying approach to understanding the rules, processes, and constitutional structure of European integration. Drawing on law and economics, rational choice theory, public choice theory, constructivist theory, constitutional economics, and other dimensions of rational analysis, he provides an essential and compelling framework for current understanding and future research that will guide students, policymakers, and scholars of the EU for decades. This volume shows, to paraphrase Molière in Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme, that for 70 years the EU has been 'speaking' law and economics without knowing it.
