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Informationen zum Autor Thomas J. Webster is a professor of economics in the Department of Finance and Economics of Pace University's Lubin School of Business in New York City. Before joining the faculty at Pace University, Dr. Webster held positions as an international economist with the Central Intelligence Agency, the U.S. Department of Defense, Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company, and Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company. Dr. Webster has served as graduate and undergraduate finance program chair, and as faculty advisor to Beta Gamma Sigma, the international honor society for collegiate schools of business. He is the recipient of the Lubin School of Business Scholarly Research Award for Basic Scholarship, the Lubin School of Business Outstanding Faculty Service Award, the Pace University Award for Distinguished Service, and the Beta Gamma Sigma Commitment to Excellence Award. Dr. Webster received his BA from the School of International Service of American University, and his MA, MPhil, and PhD from the City University of New York. Klappentext This innovative textbook is a concise and axiomatic introduction to the principles of game theory-the formal study of move and countermove. Undergraduate business and economics students with a background in the principles of microeconomics and college mathematics will find the material presented in this textbook focused, comprehensive, and accessible. Inhaltsverzeichnis PREFACE1 INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORYIntroductionStrategic behaviorShort history of game theoryLexicon of game theoryRational versus actual behaviorPractice ExercisesPART I: STATIC GAMES WITH COMPLETE INFORMATION2 COALITION GAMESIntroductionPrisoner's dilemma The extensive form The normal formNash equilibrium Shortcut for finding-pure strategy Nash equilibria Determinants of business collusion Number of firms with similar interests Firm size relative to the industry VisibilityPractice Exercises3 STRATEGIC MOVES AND DETERRING DEFECTION Introduction Strategic movesDeterring defection Contracts Reputation Cutting off communications Preventing retreat Brinksmanship Incrementalism Teamwork AgentsPractice exercises4 COMPETITION GAMESIntroductionStrictly-dominant strategiesWeakly-dominant strategiesIterated elimination of dominated strategiesThree-player gamesNon-dominant strategiesMaximin (secure) strategyPractice exercises5 COORDINATION GAMESIntroductionBattle-of-the-sexes gameFocal-point equilibriumDeveloping a theory of focal-point equilibria FramingPractice Exercises6 INFINITELY-REPEATED GAMESIntroductionCoalitionsRepeated static gamesTrigger strategies Evaluating payoffs in infinitely-repeated gamesPractice Exercises7 FINITELY-REPEATED GAMESIntroductionFinitely-repeated games with a certain end End-of-game problemFinitely-repeated games with an uncertain end A word of cautionConcluding remarksPractice Exercises8 EVOLUTION GAMESIntroductionEvolutionary game theoryReproductive successEvolutionary equilibriumNetworks Positive feedback effects Network game Implications Practice Exercises9 TIT-FOR-TATIntroductionTit-for-tatEnd-of-game problemPractice Exercises10 MIXING PURE STRATEGIESIntroductionZero-sum games Matching penniesMinimax theoremMixed strategiesOptimal mixing rulesCalculating optimal mixing rulesWhen to use optimal mixing rulesHow to use optimal mixing rulesBluffingPractice Exercises11. CONTINUOUS STRATEGIESIntroduction Continuous strategies Best-response (reaction) functions Tragedy of the commons Shifting best-response functions Practice Exercises12. STATIC OLIGOPOLY GAMESIntroductionCournot model Advertising in a Cournot settingBertrand model Bertrand paradoxPractice Exercises13. STRATEGIC TRADE POLICYIntroduction Discrete pure strategies Continuous pure strategies National welfare Intraindustry trade Imperfect competition Intraindustry coalitions...
