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Belief as Emotion argues that belief is a type of emotion, where emotions are understood as irreducibly blended states that transcend the cognitive/non-cognitive divide, containing representational, motivational and phenomenological elements.
List of contents
- Preface
- 1: Introduction
- 1.1 Is the view of belief as emotion problematically revisionary?
- 1.2 The standard view of belief and the rise of non-doxasticism
- 1.3 Is this a "merely verbal" dispute"?
- 1.4 Chapter summaries
- 2: Belief as a Blended State
- 2.1 The belief emotion
- 2.2 Questions and clarifications
- 2.3 Different ways of characterizing the belief emotion
- 2.4 Summary
- 3: Defending Doxasticism about Delusions
- 3.1 Motivations for non-doxasticism about delusions
- 3.2 Countering non-doxasticism
- 3.3 Delusions as recalcitrant emotions
- 3.4 Summary
- 4: Defending Doxasticism about Religious Conviction and Political Ideology
- 4.1 Non- doxasticism in the religious and political domains
- 4.2 Critique of religious and political non-doxasticism
- 4.3 Addressing the normative question
- 4.4 Summary
- 5: Trusting is Believing
- 5.1 Arguments that Trusting is not believing
- 5.2 Arguments that there are no good non-evidential reasons for trust
- 5.3 There can be good non-evidential reasons for emotions, including belief
- 5.4 Other approaches
- 5.5 Summary
- 6: Implicit attitudes and Self-Deception: Examples of Emotional Conflict
- 6.1 Self-Deception
- 6.2 Implicit attitudes
- 6.3 The "messiness" of belief
- 6.4 Summary
- 7: Deep Disagreement and Belief Alteration
- 7.1 Why engage with fringe beliefs?
- 7.2 Limits on when to engage
- 7.3 Closed-minded engagement
- 7.4 Belief alteration as emotion alteration
- 7.5 Summary
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
About the author
Miriam Schleifer McCormick is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Richmond. Her central research interests focus on the nature and norms of belief. This interest has also led her to think and write about reasons, agency, hope, imagination, and emotions. She has published articles on issues at the cross section of epistemology and ethics, and is the author of Believing Against the Evidence: Agency and the Ethics of Belief (Routledge, 2015) She is a researcher in the normativity and affectivity axis of GRIN and collaborating member of the ethical foundation axis at CRÉ, research centres based at the Université de Montréal.
Summary
Belief as Emotion argues that belief is a type of emotion, where emotions are understood as irreducibly blended states that transcend the cognitive/non-cognitive divide, containing representational, motivational and phenomenological elements.
