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Kulp provides a thorough examination of John Dewey's influential arguments against traditional theories of knowledge; in particular against a traditional spectator theory of knowledge, the thesis that knowing is fundamentally a passive beholding relation between the knower and the object known.
Kulp presents Dewey's arguments with unusual clarity, but, ultimately, finds them deficient. He also lays the basis for a defense of a spectator theory of having knowledge, a basis that incorporates important considerations about introspective knowledge. American philosophers have recently revived their interest in Dewey's work. Such philosophers as well as students and scholars involved with the study of American thought and schools of philosophy will find Kulp's book extremely useful.
List of contents
Introduction
Science and the Spectator Theory of Knowledge
Heisenberg's Principle of Indeterminacy and the Spectator Theory of Knowledge
Instrumental Thought and the Spectator Theory of Knowledge
Epistemological Puzzles and the Spectator Theory of Knowledge
Dewey's Current Allies and the Spectator Theory of Knowledge
Conclusion
Selected Bibliography
Index
About the author
Chris Kulp
