The Economics of Violence in Latin America - A Theory of Political Competition

This study, for the first time, uses modern political economic theory (public choice theory, public goods theory, and game theory) to create a theoretical framework for comparative political analysis. This framework, which includes the nonindustrial world, treats both violence and democratic processes as normal methods of political competition. Deductive in nature, the theory redefines political variables according to their economic counterparts. Chaffee applies microeconomic theory to generate hypotheses and conclusions, using examples from Latin America to illustrate the efficacy of the framework.

The Economics of Violence in Latin America will interest political scientists, economists, and policy-makers, especially those concerned with democratic theory and practice in the nonindustrialized world.

List of contents

Introduction
A Question of Theory
Latin America's Revolutions
Political Entrepreneurs
Political Competition
The Dilemma of Political Competition
Political Development and the Institutionalization of Political Entrepreneurship
The Calculus of Participation
Comparisons and Implications
Selected Bibliography
Index

About the author

Wilber A. Chaffee

Product details

• Authors: Wilber A. Chaffee, Chaffee Wilber A.
• Publisher: Bloomsbury
• Languages: English
• Product format: Hardback
• Released: 30.09.1992
• EAN: 9780275942984
• ISBN: 978-0-275-94298-4
• Subjects: Social sciences, law, business > Social sciences (general); South America, BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economics / Theory, POLITICAL SCIENCE / History & Theory, POLITICAL SCIENCE / World / Caribbean & Latin American, Political science & theory, Economic theory & philosophy, Political science and theory, Economic theory and philosophy, Central America, Mexico and Central America, Politics, Law, and Government: Comparative Politics