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This book provides an analysis of strategic behavior in international crises. Various aspects of crisis decision and interaction, such as initiation, misperception, deception, learning, and termination, are studied by means of a game model that incorporates psychological variables. This integrative approach is designed to narrow the gap between psychological and game-theoretical studies of crisis, which are generally considered to be incompatible. The utility of the approach is demonstrated by means of an in-depth case study of the 1967 Middle East crisis.
This study will be of interest to scholars in political science and international relations and political science, crisis theory, and game theory.
List of contents
Crisis Decision-Making
:Psychological vs. Rational-Choice Explanations
The Crisis Model I: Deriving Player Types and the Composite Matrix
The Crisis Model II: Crisis Behavior and Outcome
The 1967 Middle East Crisis: Research Design and the Single-Case Study Methodology
Decision-Making in the 1967 Middle East Crisis
Summary and Conclusions
Bibliography
Index
About the author
BEN D. MOR is Assistant Professor in International Relations and teaches in the Program of National Security of the University of Haifa and the National Defense College of the Israeli Defense Force at the University of Haifa in Israel. Previously, he has taught at New York University and the University of Nebraska, Lincoln. He has contributed to publications such as the
Journal of Peace Research and
Rationality and Society.
