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Like the widely praised original, this new edition is compact, clearly written, and accessible to the nonspecialist. First, the book chronicles and analyzes the twenty-year struggle to maintain South Vietnamese independence. Joes tells the story with a sympathetic focus on South Viet Nam and is highly critical of U.S. military strategy and tactics in fighting this war. He claims that the fall of South Viet Nam was not inevitable, that an abrupt and public termination of U.S. aid provoked a crisis of confidence inside South Viet Nam that led to the debacle. Students and scholars of military studies, South East Asia, U.S. foreign policy, or the general reader interested in this fascinating period in 20th century history, will find this new edition to be invaluable reading.
After discussing the principal American mistakes in the conflict, Joes outlines a workable alternative strategy that would have saved South Viet Nam while minimizing U.S. involvement and casualties. He documents the enormous sacrifices made by the South Vietnamese allies, who in proportion to population suffered forty times the casualties the Americans did. He concludes by linking the final conquest of South Viet Nam to an increased level of Soviet adventurism which resulted in the invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. military build-up under Presidents Carter and Reagan, and the eventual collapse of the USSR. The complicated factors involved in the war are here offered in a consolidated, objective form, enabling the reader to consider the implications of U.S. experiences in South Viet Nam for future policy in other world areas.
List of contents
Preface: The Challenge of Viet Nam
Viet Nam Before 1945
The Viet Minh
The First Indochina War 1946-1954
After the Partition
The Viet Cong
Fighting Guerrillas
The Overthrow of President Diem
The ARVN from Dien Bien Phu to Tet
The Great Tet Offensive
Vietnamization: From the Parrot's Beak to the Easter Offensive
The United States in Viet Nam: Some Reflections
South Viet Nam on Its Own: 1973-1975
The Last Days of South Viet Nam
Conclusion: Viet Nam and the Future
Epilogue 2001: South Viet Nam's Defeat Revisited
Selected Bibliography
Index
About the author
ANTHONY JAMES JOES is Professor of Political Science and Director of the International Relations Program at Saint Joseph's University in Philadelphia./e He is the author or contributing editor of ten books, has published numerous articles in professional journals, and has traveled and lectured on four continents.
