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The profound political changes in the USSR and Eastern Europe during 1989 have forced the United States and its Western European allies to reevaluate both their long held military strategy of nuclear deterrence and the traditional role of NATO in European affairs. In this volume, Stephen Cimbala considers the ways in which American military priorities will have to change now that the tangible threat to Europe has been removed, exploring the options available to America and NATO given the new political and economic realities in Europe and the Soviet Union. Drawing upon a rich literature of Soviet and American defense strategy, Cimbala examines the structure and effectiveness of deterrence as a military strategy, the relationship between conventional and nuclear weapons, the likely course of future conflicts, and alternative military strategies.
Following an introductory chapter which defines the concepts of deterrence and dissuasion and offers an overview of the changing character of European politics, Cimbala reviews the political context for the development of military strategy in Europe. Subsequent chapters consider the relationship between military stability and the likelihood of winning wars in their initial stages, analyze the issue of deterrence during war, discuss the potential for atypical wars in the future, and investigate the linkages between deception and deterrence. A separate chapter addresses the attempt to substitute non-nuclear dissuasion for nuclear deterrence, in the form of anti-nuclear strategic defenses which could defeat nuclear offenses. In the final chapter, Cimbala summarizes his conclusions and makes some additional observations about the implications of our new view of NATO and deterrence. Students of international relations, foreign policy, and military studies will find Cimbala's work enlightening and provocative reading.
List of contents
Introduction
Removing the Nuclear Shadow: Political Context
Temptation to Attack The Initial Period of War
Limiting War: On the Extension of Deterrence into Military Conflict
Atypical Wars: Beyond Deterrence?
Military Deception and Deterrence
Escaping the Nuclear Revolution: Anti-Nuclear Defenses and Deterrence
Strategy After Deterrence: Concluding Observations
Selected Bibliography
Index
About the author
Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works in the fields of national security studies, nuclear arms control and other fields, including Multinational Military Intervention: NATO Policy, Strategy and Burden Sharing (with P. K. Forster, Ashgate, 2010). An award winning Penn State teacher, Dr. Cimbala has consulted for various U.S. government agencies and defense contractors.
STEPHEN J. CIMBALA is Professor of Political Science at Penn State University, Delaware County. He has contributed to the literature of international relations and U.S. security and defense policy for more than 20 years, and he has written or edited more than 30 books. Among his latest publications are Collective Insecurity (Greenwood, 1995) and Clinton and Post-Cold War Defense (Praeger, 1996). In addition, Cimbala serves on the editorial review boards of several journals, including Armed Forces and Society.
