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Buchanan believed that individuals are fundamentally willing to cooperate with others. It was at the center of his works in public finance in the late 1940s and early 1950s, and also crucial to his work in public choice in the 1960s. The purpose of this book is to show which forms this belief took over these two decades or so, and to explain the continuity between these forms. We adopt a historical approach that allows us to recount the story of how Buchanan came to develop a theory of collective action, including his conception of cooperation in small groups, to implement a technical condition about the pricing of public goods he defended early in his career. We describe the different steps Buchanan took, the encounters that influenced him, and the events and challenges that led him to revise his views to make room for this fundamental philosophical conviction.
List of contents
1. Introduction; 2. Spillover effects, the pricing of roads, and the problem of social cost; 3. Buchanan's beliefs about individualized prices put to the test; 4. Virginia political economy, collective action and public finance; 5. Towards a theory of collective action; 6. A theory of collective action; Conclusion; References.
Summary
This Element shows that individuals are fundamentally willing to cooperate with others. A historical approach is shown of how the author came to develop a theory of collective action, including his conception of cooperation in small groups, to implement a technical condition about the pricing of public goods he defended early in his career.
Foreword
The Element proposes a new history of the origins of public choice theory, and Buchanan's theory of collective action.
