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The Difficult Construction of European Banking Union examines the political, legal and economic issues surrounding the lacunae and design faults of European Banking Union and its problematic operation.
List of contents
Introduction: The Difficult Construction of European Banking Union
David Howarth and Joachim Schild Section 1: On the Political Science and Political Economy of Banking Union 1. Banking union: the disadvantages of opportunism
David G. Mayes 2. Germany and France at Cross Purposes. The Case of Banking Union
Joachim Schild 3. Liberal Economic Nationalism, Financial Stability and Commission Leniency in Banking Union
Shawn Donnelly 4. Theoretical Lessons from EMU and Banking Union: Plus ça change
David Howarth and Lucia Quaglia Section 2: On the design and functioning of supranational bank supervision 5. Building responsive supervision over smaller banks in Europe: an insight from the Principal-Agent perspective
Jakub Gren 6. Harmonising national options and discretions in the EU banking regulation
Zdenek Kudrna and Sonja Puntscher Riekmann 7. Consultations and the ECB as Prudential Regulator: Enhancing Legitimacy?
Ute Lettanie 8. The multiple accountabilities of the European Banking Authority
John-Paul Salter 9. Rethinking the allocation of macroprudential mandates within the Banking Union - a perspective from east of the BU
Katalin Mér¿ and Dóra Piroska Section 3: On the design of the Single Resolution Mechanism 10. Banking union: the problem of untried systems
David G. Mayes 11. International Law as a Negotiation Tool in Banking Union: the case of the Single Resolution Fund
Ioannis G. Asimakopoulos 12. A Common Backstop to the Single Resolution Fund
Florian Brandt and Matthias Wohlfahrt Section 4: Setbacks en route to a sustainable Banking Union: the European Deposit Insurance Scheme and Bank Structural Reform 13. The difficult construction of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme: a step too far in Banking Union?
David Howarth and Lucia Quaglia 14. Advocacy coalitions and the lack of deposit insurance in Banking Union
Shawn Donnelly 15. Deposit guarantee reform in Europe: does European deposit insurance scheme increase banking stability?
Rosaria Cerrone 16. Balancing market liquidity: Bank Structural Reform caught between growth and stability
Vanessa Endrejat and Matthias Thiemann
About the author
David Howarth is Professor of European Political Economy at the University of Luxembourg and a former Jean Monnet Chair at the University of Edinburgh. He is the author or co-author of numerous works on EU economic governance, including The Political Economy of Banking Union, 2016.
Joachim Schild is Professor of Comparative Politics at Trier University, Germany. He published on Franco-German relations, French European Policy and the political economy of European integration. He co-authored (with Ulrich Krotz) Shaping Europe: France, Germany, and Embedded Bilateralism from the Elysée Treaty to Twenty-First Century Politics, 2013.
Summary
The Difficult Construction of European Banking Union examines the political, legal and economic issues surrounding the lacunae and design faults of European Banking Union and its problematic operation.
