Evolutionary Games and the Replicator Dynamics

Klappentext This Element introduces the replicator dynamics for symmetric and asymmetric games where the strategy sets are metric spaces. The authors provide conditions to approximate the replicator dynamics on a space of measures by means of a finite-dimensional dynamical system and a sequence of measure-valued Markov processes. Vorwort This Element introduces the replicator dynamics in games where the strategy sets are general spaces and proposes examples in economics. Zusammenfassung This Element introduces the replicator dynamics for symmetric and asymmetric games where the strategy sets are metric spaces. The authors provide conditions to approximate the replicator dynamics on a space of measures by means of a finite-dimensional dynamical system and a sequence of measure-valued Markov processes. Inhaltsverzeichnis 1. Introduction and technical preliminaries; 2. Normal form games; 3. Evolutionary games: the asymmetric case; 4. Evolutionary games: symmetric case; 5. Finite dimensional approximations; 6. The replicator dynamics as a deterministic approximation; 7. Conclusions and suggestions for future research; Symbols; Abbreviations; Appendix; Bibliography.

Product details

• Authors: Onésimo Hernández-Lerma, Saul Mendoza-Palacios, Saul (Centro De Investigacion Y Mendoza-Palacios
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press ELT
• Languages: English
• Product format: Hardback
• Released: 06.06.2024
• EAN: 9781009472302
• ISBN: 978-1-0-0947230-2
• No. of pages: 75
• Series: Elements in Evolutionary Economics
• Subjects: Social sciences, law, business > Business > Economics; BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economics / General, economic growth, game theory, Economics of industrial organisation, Economics of industrial organization