Fr. 96.00

Back to 'Things in Themselves' - A Phenomenological Foundation for Classical Realism

English · Paperback / Softback

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Description

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In an enlightening dialogue with Descartes, Kant, Husserl and Gadamer, Professor Seifert argues that the original inspiration of phenomenology was nothing other than the primordial insight of philosophy itself, the foundation of philosophia perennis. His radical rethinking of the phenomenological method results in a universal, objectivist philosophy in direct continuity with Plato, Aristotle and Augustine.

In order to validate the classical claim to know autonomous being, the author defends Husserl's methodological principle "Back to things themselves" from empiricist and idealist critics, including the later Husserl, and replies to the arguments of Kant which attempt to discredit the knowability of things in themselves.

Originally published in 1982, this book culminates in a phenomenological and critical unfolding of the Augustinian cogito, as giving access to immutable truth about necessary essences and the real existence of personal being.

List of contents

Analytical Table of Contents. Preface Part 1: The Classical Principle of Phenomenology: "Back to Things Themselves" Part 2: The Cogito and Indubitable Knowledge Part 3: Objective Knowledge of "Things in Themselves"

About the author










Josef Seifert

Product details

Authors Josef Seifert
Publisher Routledge
 
Languages English
Product format Paperback / Softback
Released 21.12.2015
 
EAN 9781138964303
ISBN 978-1-138-96430-3
No. of pages 386
Dimensions 156 mm x 234 mm x 21 mm
Weight 585 g
Subject Non-fiction book > Philosophy, religion > Philosophy: general, reference works

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