Choosing Normative Concepts

List of contents

• 1: Ardent Realism


• 2: Alternative Normative Concepts


• 3: Qualifications and Objections


• 4: Normative Concepts


• 5: Normative Properties


• 6: Presentationalism


• 7: Being Against What Is Plainly Right


• 8: Connections


• 9: Thick Concepts


• 10: Some Metaphilosophical Issues


• 11: Concluding Remarks

About the author

Matti Eklund is Chair Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at Uppsala University. He received his PhD from MIT in 2000. Previously he has taught at a number of other universities, including University of Colorado-Boulder and Cornell University. He has published on a variety of topics in metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, and metaethics.

Summary

The concepts we use to value and prescribe (concepts like good, right, ought) are historically contingent, and we could have found ourselves with others. But what does it mean to say that some concepts are better than others for purposes of action-guiding and deliberation? What is it to choose between different normative conceptual frameworks?

Product details

• Authors: Matti Eklund, Matti (Professor of Theoretical Philosophy Eklund
• Publisher: Oxford University Press
• Languages: English
• Product format: Paperback / Softback
• Released: 17.10.2019
• EAN: 9780198851035
• ISBN: 978-0-19-885103-5
• No. of pages: 240
• Subjects: Non-fiction book > Philosophy, religion > Miscellaneous; Philosophy of Language, PHILOSOPHY / Ethics & Moral Philosophy, PHILOSOPHY / Language, Ethics & moral philosophy, Ethics and moral philosophy