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This book engages with topics in Aristotle's philosophy of mind, some well-known and hotly debated, some new and yet to be explored. The contributors analyze Aristotle's arguments and present their cases in ways that invite contemporary philosophers of mind to consider the potentials-and pitfalls-of an Aristotelian philosophy of mind.
List of contents
Introduction
Pavel Gregoric and Jakob Leth Fink
Part I. Methodology
1. Δόξαι and the tools of dialectic in De anima I.1–3
Colin Guthrie King
2. In Search of the Essence of the Soul: Aristotle’s Scientific Method and Practice in De anima II.1–2
Giulia Mingucci
3. Method and Doctrine in Aristotle’s Natural Psychology: De anima II.5
Robert Bolton
Part II. Perception
4. Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias on Sight as a Relative
Katerina Ierodiakonou
5. Perceiving that We are Not Seeing and Hearing: Reflexive Awareness in Aristotle
Pavel Gregoric
Part III. Representation
6. Eidōla and Phantasmata in Aristotle: Three Senses of "Image" in Aristotelian Psychology
Filip Radovic
7. Aristotle and the Cartesian Theatre
Victor Caston
Part IV. Intellect
8. Thinking Bodies: Aristotle on the Biological Basis of Human Cognition
Sophia Connell
9. The Nοῦς-Body Relationship in Aristotle’s De Anima
Robert Roreitner
Part V. Hylomorphism
10. Aristotelian Dualism, Good; Aristotelian Hylomorphism, Bad
Howard Robinson
11. Hylomorphic Mental Causation
Christopher Shields
About the author
Pavel Gregoric is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Philosophy in Zagreb, Croatia. He is the author of Aristotle on the Common Sense (2007) and the co-editor of Pseudo-Aristotle: De mundo (On the Cosmos). A Commentary (2021).
Jakob Leth Fink is Postdoctoral Fellow in the Department of Philosophy, Linguistics and Theory of Science, University of Gothenburg, Sweden. He is the editor of Phantasia in Aristotle’s Ethics (2018) and The Development of Dialectic from Plato to Aristotle (2012).
Summary
This book engages with topics in Aristotle’s philosophy of mind, some well-known and hotly debated, some new and yet to be explored. The contributors analyze Aristotle’s arguments and present their cases in ways that invite contemporary philosophers of mind to consider the potentials—and pitfalls—of an Aristotelian philosophy of mind.
