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Women have engaged in philosophical discourse since antiquity, but most of these women's voices were lost or intentionally excluded. In
The Metaphysics of Margaret Cavendish and Anne Conway, Marcy P. Lascano recovers the important philosophical contributions of two early modern women. The book compares the two thinkers, paying close attention to their views on metaphysical topics such as substance, monism, self-motion, individuation, and identity over time, as well as causation, perception, and freedom. Drawing on their original writing and engaging with existing scholarship, Lascano presents the first comparison of Cavendish and Conway. In turn, she enlarges our view of these thinkers and their unique ways of understanding the world arounds us.
List of contents
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- Abbreviations
- Chronology
- Chapter 1: Matter and Spirit
- Chapter 2: Wholes and Parts
- Chapter 3: Life and Self-Motion
- Chapter 4: Individuals and Individuation
- Chapter 5: Causation and Perception
- Chapter 6: Liberty and Necessity
- Chapter 7: Natural Philosophy and Theodicy
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
About the author
Marcy P. Lascano is a Professor of Philosophy at University of Kansas. She has published several works on women philosophers, including Mary Astell, Margaret Cavendish, Anne Conway, Emilie du Châtelet, and Damaris Masham and is the co-editor of Early Modern Philosophy and Feminist History of Philosophy: The Recovery and Evaluation of Women's Philosophical Thought.
Summary
Marcy P. Lascano examines the philosophical systems of Margaret Cavendish and Anne Conway. Cavendish and Conway are both known for their monism, i.e., the view that there is only one kind of substance in the world, which is capable of self-motion and life. Lascano here provides detailed analyses of their respective accounts of monism, substance, self-motion, individuation, and identity over time, as well as causation, perception, and freedom. She thereby shows how their superficially similar views provide importantly different explanations of the workings of the world.
Lascano illuminates under-appreciated nuances in Cavendish's and Conway's views, highlighting the important differences between their systems. Examining their views in tandem allows readers to appreciate the originality of their ideas and their responses to seventeenth-century debates. The book's final chapter then explains how Cavendish's metaphysics lays the groundwork for her natural philosophy, while Conway's metaphysics provides the foundation for her theodicy.
Drawing on their original writing and engaging with existing scholarship, Lascano presents the first sustained comparison of Cavendish's and Conway's metaphysics revealing the differences between Cavendish's thoroughgoing naturalism and Conway's spiritualism. In turn, she enlarges our view of these thinkers and their unique ways of understanding the world around us.
