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This book examines the structure of the rule on restrictive agreements in the context of vertical intra-brand price and territorial restraints, analysing, comparing and evaluating their treatment in US antitrust and EU competition law. It examines the concept of 'agreement' as the threshold question of the rule on restrictive agreements, the structure and focus of antitrust/competition law analysis, the treatment of vertical intra-brand price and territorial restrictions and their place in the test of antitrust/competition law. The treatment of vertical intra-brand restraints is one of the most controversial issues of contemporary competition law and policy, and there are substantial differences between the world's two leading regimes in this regard. In the US, resale price fixing merits an effects-analysis, while in the EU it is prohibited almost outright. Likewise, territorial protection is treated laxly in the US, while in the EU absolute territorial protection - due to the single market imperative - is strictly prohibited. Using a novel approach of legal analysis, this book will be of interest to academics and scholars of business and commercial law, international and comparative law.
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EU and US Competition Law: Divided in Unity?
Summary
This book examines the structure of the rule on restrictive agreements in the context of vertical intra-brand price and territorial restraints, analysing, comparing and evaluating their treatment in US antitrust and EU competition law. It examines the concept of 'agreement' as the threshold question of the rule on restrictive agreements, the struct
Report
'The book demonstrates that, as a result of recent changes in US law, not followed in the EU, there is now a significant difference in the treatment of vertical restraints between the two jurisdictions. The author thoroughly documents these differences and discusses how they accord with modern economic analysis.' George A. Hay, Cornell Law School, USA 'Through a minute and contextual analysis of the application of the relevant rules on vertical restraints in the US and the EU, Csongor Nagy makes a unique contribution to comparative competition law and very competently helps practitioners to avoid the pitfalls of false friends.' Jules Stuyck, KU Leuven, Belgium and the Central European University, Hungary
