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Informationen zum Autor John Broome is White's Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Oxford, a fellow of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, and an Adjunct Professor of Philosophy at the Australian National University. He is the author of amongst others Weighing Goods (1991), Ethics Out of Economics (1999), Weighing Lives (2004), and Climate matters (2012). Klappentext Rationality Through Reasoning answers the question of how people are motivated to do what they believe they ought to do, built on a comprehensive account of normativity, rationality and reasoning that differs significantly from much existing philosophical thinking.* Develops an original account of normativity, rationality and reasoning significantly different from the majority of existing philosophical thought* Includes an account of theoretical and practical reasoning that explains how reasoning is something we ourselves do, rather than something that happens in us* Gives an account of what reasons are and argues that the connection between rationality and reasons is much less close than many philosophers have thought* Contains rigorous new accounts of oughts including owned oughts, agent-relative reasons, the logic of requirements, instrumental rationality, the role of normativity in reasoning, following a rule, the correctness of reasoning, the connections between intentions and beliefs, and much else.* Offers a new answer to the 'motivation question' of how a normative belief motivates an action. Zusammenfassung Rationality Through Reasoning answers the question of how people are motivated to do what they believe they ought to do, built on a comprehensive account of normativity, rationality and reasoning that differs significantly from much existing philosophical thinking. Inhaltsverzeichnis Preface xi 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Motivation 1 1.2 This book 4 Notes 6 2 Ought 8 2.1 The meaning of 'ought' 8 2.2 Normative and non-normative oughts 9 2.3 Owned and unowned oughts 12 2.4 Qualified and unqualified oughts 25 Notes 29 3 Objective, Subjective and Prospective Oughts 31 3.1 Sidgwick's View 31 3.2 The need to decide 34 3.3 Objective and prospective oughts 36 3.4 Valuing prospects 41 3.5 Summary 45 Notes 45 4 Reasons 46 4.1 Introduction and preliminaries 46 4.2 Pro toto reasons 49 4.3 Pro tanto reasons 51 4.4 Most reason 62 4.5 Ownership of reasons 65 Notes 69 5 Responding to Reasons 71 5.1 Rationality and responding to reasons 71 5.2 The quick objection 74 5.3 Attitudinal reasons 75 5.4 Sufficiency of reasons 82 Notes 87 6 Responding to Reason-Beliefs 88 6.1 The Enkratic Condition 88 6.2 Meeting your own standards 91 6.3 Responding correctly to P-beliefs 101 6.4 Conclusion 107 Notes 108 7 Requirements 109 7.1 Two sorts of requirement 109 7.2 Property requirements 110 7.3 Source requirements 116 7.4 Logic for requirements? 119 7.5 Ought 126 Notes 129 8 Conditional Requirements 132 8.1 Application and content 132 8.2 Conditional requirements of rationality 134 Notes 146 Appendix to Chapter 8 148 9 Synchronic Rationality 149 9.1 Introduction and method 149 9.2 Consistency 154 9.3 Deduction 157 9.4 Instrumental Rationality 159 9.5 Enkrasia 170 9.6 Bayesian requirements 175 Notes 175 10 Diachronic Rationality 177 10.1 Persistence of Intention 177 10.2 The rationality of doing as you decide 181 10.3 Diachronic requirements on beliefs 185 10.4 Basing prohibitions and bas...
