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A major reassessment of a key aspect of British strategy and defence policy in the first half of the twentieth century.
The main contribution of this new study is an investigation of the role of Malta in British military strategy, as planned and as it actually developed, in the period between the mid 1920s and the end of the war in North Africa in May 1943. It demonstrates that the now widely accepted belief that Malta was 'written off as indefensible' before the war was mistaken, and focuses on Malta's actual wartime role in the Mediterranean war, assessing the numerous advantages, many often ignored, that the British derived from retention of the island. The conclusions made challenge recent assertions that Malta's contribution was of limited value and will be of great interest to both students and professionals in the field.
List of contents
1. The Base at Malta in the 1920s 2. The Failure to Strengthen Malta's Defences, 1930-35 3. Malta in the Abyssinian Crisis, 1935-36 4. Prelude to War, 1936-39 5. Final Preparations for War 6. The Threat of Invasion 7. The Initial Onslaught 8. The German Intervention in the Mediterranean 1941 9. Malta's Contribution to 'Crusader' 10. The 1942 Siege of Malta 11. Malta's Contribution to the Recovery of North Africa 12. Conclusion
About the author
Douglas Austin was born in Malta and served in the RAF before a career in banking in New York and London. In 2002 he gained a Ph.D at University College, London in military history.
Summary
This book uses official records to show that Malta, far from being written off, was developed in the inter-war years as a British offensive base, and that the island's air and naval forces made a major contribution to Allied victory in North Africa.
