Phenomenology of Moral Normativity

Informationen zum Autor William H. Smith is Lecturer in Philosophy at Seattle University. Klappentext William H. Smith draws on both phenomenology and contemporary moral theory to argue that the source of moral normativity-that is, the justification of morality's binding force-is the legitimate authority of other persons to hold us morally accountable and our self-responsible commitment to live up to that demand. Zusammenfassung William H. Smith draws on both phenomenology and contemporary moral theory to argue that the source of moral normativity—that is, the justification of morality’s binding force—is the legitimate authority of other persons to hold us morally accountable and our self-responsible commitment to live up to that demand. Inhaltsverzeichnis Introduction: The Problem of Moral Normativity Part 1: The First-Person 1. Moral Realism and Korsgaard’s Dilemma 2. Respect and Drummond’s Husserlian Metaethics Part 2: The Second-Person 3. Dignity and Darwall’s Second-Person Standpoint 4. Authority and Levinas’s Face-to-Face Part 3: Subjectivity and Responsibility 5. Nihilism and Heidegger’s Fundamental Ontology 6. A Phenomenological Theory of Moral Normativity

Product details

• Authors: William Smith, William (Seattle University Smith, William (Seattle University) Smith
• Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd.
• Languages: English
• Product format: Hardback
• Released: 22.12.2011
• EAN: 9780415890687
• ISBN: 978-0-415-89068-7
• No. of pages: 232
• Series: Routledge Studies in Ethics and Moral Theory
• Subjects: Non-fiction book > Philosophy, religion > Philosophy: general, reference works; PHILOSOPHY / Ethics & Moral Philosophy, Ethics & moral philosophy, Ethics and moral philosophy